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(UN)EQUAL PROTECTION: WHY GENDER 
EQUALITY DEPENDS ON DISCRIMINATION 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter 
ABSTRACT—Most accounts of the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence describe the Court’s firm opposition to sex discrimination. 
But while the Court famously invalidated several sex-based laws at the end 
of the twentieth century, it also issued many other, less-celebrated 
decisions that sanctioned sex-specific classifications in some 
circumstances. Examining these long-ignored cases that approved of sex 
discrimination, this Article explains how the Court’s rulings in this area 
have often rejected the principle of formal equality in favor of broader 
antisubordination concerns. Outlining a new model of equal protection that 
authorizes certain forms of sex discrimination, (Un)Equal Protection 
advocates for one particular discriminatory policy that could dramatically 
promote gender equality in the decades to come. Fatherhood bonuses—
laws that give families additional parental leave when fathers stay at home 
with their newborns—have the potential to drastically reorder gendered 
divisions of labor and expand women’s workplace opportunities. Countries 
that have experimented with fatherhood bonuses have seen women with 
children spend more time in paid work, advance in their careers, and earn 
higher wages. Applying these international models to the American 
context, this Article explains why fatherhood bonuses would fit 
comfortably within our constitutional framework, which authorizes 
discriminatory policies when such policies support women’s public 
participation. (Un)Equal Protection concludes by proposing a model for 
fatherhood bonuses in the United States that would encourage more men to 
perform care work, thereby advancing the goal of gender equality for both 
sexes. 
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What if legal feminists got it all wrong? What if sex neutrality in the 
law does not bring about gender equality after all? Many gender theorists 
of the 1970s believed that their attacks on governmental sex classifications 
would substantially curb sexual oppression.1 Challenging sex-based laws as 
violations of equal protection, “sameness feminists” sought to ensure the 
equal treatment of men and women in the public sphere through targeted 
litigation.2 At the same time, however, “difference feminists” criticized the 
 
1 See Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and 
Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 86–87 (2009) (summarizing the 
history of the sameness–difference debate); see also Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal 
Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001) (discussing the equal treatment approach to equality). 
2 See generally Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and 
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1121–22 (1986) (summarizing the strategy of 
sameness feminism and questioning its value); see also David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating 
for Women’s Rights in a Man’s World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33, 55 (1984) (examining litigation brought by 
legal feminists). 
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sameness approach for ignoring women’s lived realities.3 Arguing in favor 
of gender-specific policies such as paid maternity leave, difference 
feminists asserted that the law must take into account the costs that women 
disproportionately bear in society due to pregnancy and caregiving.4 
After a series of historic Supreme Court decisions that adopted a sex-
neutral approach to discrimination, sameness feminists declared victory.5 
Pointing to Supreme Court rulings that struck down distinctions in 
education, estate administration, and public benefits, among others, they 
argued that the Court’s aversion to governmental sex classifications 
signaled the demise of special treatment for women both as a matter of law 
and as a matter of policy.6 
Today, however, with women still lagging far behind men in earnings, 
wealth, and social power, it is time to acknowledge the limitations of the 
sameness approach.7 Even though women have enjoyed formal equality 
under the law for decades—a central goal of sameness feminism—the glass 
ceiling remains stubbornly difficult to break. Although women’s workforce 
numbers and academic accomplishments grow, they still command much 
lower wages than men and remain significantly underrepresented at the 
highest corporate rungs.8 Contrary to the popular claim that society is 
witnessing an “End of Men,”9 women today actually earn less than eighty 
 
3 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN 
LAW 211–14, 229–39 (1990) [hereinafter MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE] (discussing debates 
within legal feminism); Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 703, 703–04 (2011) (summarizing various critiques offered by difference feminists).  
4 For a detailed discussion of the sameness–difference debate, see infra Part II.A and 
accompanying discussion. 
5 See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of 
the California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 391–92 (2012); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of 
Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 
444 (2011) (summarizing the common claim that “by 1970, sameness feminism had won”). 
6 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 679–81 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); see also Joan Williams, Do Women Need 
Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 279–80 (1998) 
(examining the rise of formal equality). 
7 See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist 
Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 251–54 (1998) (summarizing 
critiques of sameness feminism); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking 
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2010) (discussing 
the gender wage gap). 
8 See Kelli K. García, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 1, 25 (2012) (discussing leadership and gender); Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: 
Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 312–14 
(2004) (examining the gender wage gap). 
9 See generally MAUREEN DOWD, ARE MEN NECESSARY?: WHEN SEXES COLLIDE 135–66 (2006); 
HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 4–5 (2012) (discussing workplace gains 
made by women).  
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percent of men’s wages and constitute less than five percent of Fortune 500 
CEOs.10 In sum, despite the promises of sameness feminism, formal 
equality in law has not yet yielded actual equality for working women. 
If women are to overcome the remaining barriers that continue to 
divide the sexes, a new vision of equality is needed. This new model of 
equality must build upon existing debates within legal feminism while 
finally bringing men into the conversation. Until now, men have stood on 
the sidelines of the sameness–difference debate, appearing almost 
irrelevant to the discussion.11 Yet the barriers that hold women back at 
work today have less to do with whether laws facially discriminate against 
women (few do) and more to do with men’s failure to assume equal 
divisions of labor at home.12 
Although men have made some strides on the domestic front, women 
still perform the vast majority of childcare and housework in the United 
States.13 These longstanding patterns of gendered behavior ultimately 
constrain women’s workplace opportunities. Once they have children, most 
women take maternity leave, perform the majority of care work at home, 
and suffer lasting career damage as a result.14 In contrast, most men forego 
paternity leave, return to work, and pursue their careers unencumbered by 
familial obligations.15 
 
10 AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 3 (2013), 
available at http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/03/The-Simple-Truth-Fall-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/V38T
-WGDJ]; Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000, CATALYST (June 10, 2014), http://www.catalyst.org/
knowledge/women-ceos-fortune-1000 [http://perma.cc/73D9-BT2Y].  
11 See Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 
201, 212–13 (2008) (asserting that much of feminist discourse omits men as subjects of gender 
analysis). 
12 Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind: How the Family and Medical Leave Act Perpetuates 
Sex Inequality Across All Class Levels, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 429, 436–37 (2007) (discussing 
divisions of household labor); Joan C. Williams, Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Justice 
Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267, 1283 (2012) (attributing the stalled 
gender revolution to differences in household contributions and wage work). 
13 KIM PARKER & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD: ROLES OF MOMS 
AND DADS CONVERGE AS THEY BALANCE WORK AND FAMILY 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/03/FINAL_modern_parenthood_03-2013.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/7KDY-HCFS] (reporting that mothers spend twice the number of hours per week on childcare as 
fathers); WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARENTS’ TIME WITH KIDS MORE REWARDING THAN 
PAID WORK—AND MORE EXHAUSTING 2 (2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org
/files/2013/10/parental-time-use_10-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/339J-SG5P] (discussing the average 
number of hours that mothers and fathers spend per week on childcare and housework). 
14 See Harry Brighouse & Erik Olin Wright, Strong Gender Egalitarianism, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 360, 
366 (2008) (arguing that employers expect women to experience more workplace departures than men); 
Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 403–04 
(1999) (explaining how employers rely upon group information to make employment determinations).  
15 See Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 35 (2004) (discussing male use of parental leave); Michael Selmi, 
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Men’s reluctance to perform care work impacts every working woman, 
not simply mothers. Even young women and women who have no intention 
of having children feel the labor market effects that result from uneven 
divisions of household labor. Whether they have children or not, all women 
suffer from “maternal profiling”—the employer perception that women 
eventually will reduce their workplace commitment because of the children 
they currently have or those they will someday bear.16 Given the cultural 
force behind the concept of maternal care and the fact that women actually 
take far more family leave than men, many employers assume that young 
women pose a higher risk of exiting the labor force in comparison to 
similarly situated men.17 Because female applicants cannot signal their 
intention not to have children, certain employers may view all young 
women as riskier hires.18 Men will continue to reap the workplace benefits 
that flow from these presumptions until they significantly increase their 
leave-taking behavior, thereby diminishing employers’ underlying basis for 
engaging in maternal profiling. 
As difference feminists predicted, sex-neutral solutions to problems 
related to caregiving and family leave can yield sex-skewed results. But a 
new form of special treatment for fathers could radically disrupt this 
dynamic. Fatherhood bonuses—policies that give families additional weeks 
of paid leave if fathers stay at home with their newborns19—help facilitate 
coequal parenting, thereby reducing the damage maternal profiling 
causes.20 In Germany, for example, men’s use of paternity leave increased 
eightfold after the country recently implemented fatherhood bonuses.21 
 
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 755–59 (2000) (considering the reasons 
why few men take extended periods of parental leave). 
16 See Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Examining Gender Stereotypes in New Work/Family 
Reconciliation Policies: The Creation of a New Paradigm for Egalitarian Legislation, 18 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 305, 313–14 (2011) (discussing the effects of family responsibilities 
discrimination); Grant Barrett, All We Are Saying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at C3 (defining 
“maternal profiling” as “[e]mployment discrimination against a woman who has, or will have, 
children”). 
17 See Kaminer, supra note 8, at 313–14 (discussing the working patterns of each sex); Palazzari, 
supra note 12, at 436–37 (examining divisions of labor between the sexes).  
18 See Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the 
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2169 (1994) (discussing maternal profiling).  
19 INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LEAVE 
POLICIES AND RELATED RESEARCH 2013 17 (Peter Moss ed., 2013), available at http://www.
leavenetwork.org/fileadmin/Leavenetwork/Annual_reviews/2013_complete.6june.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8TG9-R9MQ] (discussing the benefits of individualizing entitlements for fathers).  
20 See de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 326–27 (describing European father-based incentives). 
21 See INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 36 (reporting that 
German men’s use of paternity leave increased from 3.3 percent in 2006 to 27.8 percent in the third 
quarter of 2011); see also Andrea Doucet, For Equality, Take Fathers into Account, N.Y. TIMES, June 
14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/05/how-can-we-get-men-to-do-more-at-
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Likewise, jurisdictions such as Québec, Norway, Sweden, and Spain have 
enacted leave laws that incentivize father care.22 When this happens—that 
is, when men stay home with their babies even for relatively short periods 
of time—tectonic shifts begin to occur at work and at home: women spend 
more time in paid work, earn higher wages, and advance in their careers.23 
Meanwhile, leave-taking men perform a greater share of housework and 
spend less time at the office long after their parental leave ends.24 
Fatherhood bonuses in the United States would represent a form of 
governmental sex discrimination by favoring men over women. 
Nevertheless, they would fit comfortably within a constitutional framework 
that tolerates certain forms of sex discrimination. In order to understand 
why, this Article takes a fresh look at the Supreme Court’s sex equality 
cases. The conventional wisdom in this area holds that the Court has 
remained doggedly committed to formal equality in its constitutional sex 
discrimination rulings since the 1970s.25 Yet this oversimplified take on the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence ignores the numerous instances in 
which the Court has allowed many sex-based laws to withstand judicial 
 
home/for-gender-equality-take-fathers-into-account [http://perma.cc/ZT6K-K59W] (discussing changes 
in caregiving patterns among German parents). 
22 INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 12–15, 37–38; Diane-
Gabrielle Tremblay, More Time for Daddy: Québec Leads the Way with Its New Parental Leave Policy, 
18 OUR SCHOOLS/OUR SELVES 223, 226 (2009) (discussing Québec’s system); Katrin Bennhold, In 
Sweden, Men Can Have It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/
europe/10iht-sweden.html [http://perma.cc/XJ5V-V9C4] (summarizing policies in Sweden and 
Germany); see also Janet C. Gornick & Marcia K. Meyers, Creating Gender Egalitarian Societies: An 
Agenda for Reform, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 313, 331 (2008) (stating that fathers’ take-up rates rose 
significantly after implementation of fatherhood bonuses).  
23 See Elly-Ann Johansson, The Effect of Own and Spousal Parental Leave on Earnings 1–29 (Inst. 
for Labour Mkt. Policy Evaluation, Working Paper No. 2010:4, 2010) (finding that fathers’ use of 
paternity leave positively correlated with maternal earnings); Ankita Patnaik, Reserving Time for 
Daddy: The Short and Long-Run Consequences of Fathers’ Quotas 3–4 (Oct. 14, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Cornell University) (discussing the effects of father-targeted leave on mothers 
in Québec). 
24 See Patnaik, supra note 23, at 11 (noting that couples exposed to paternity leave reforms 
exhibited less “sex specialization” in performing household tasks); see also Nevena Zhelyazkova, 
Fathers’ Use of Parental Leave. What Do We Know? 26 (Maastricht Econ. & Soc. Research Inst. on 
Innovation & Tech. (UNU-MERIT), Working Paper No. 2013-022, 2013) (summarizing research on the 
benefits of increased male participation in parental leave policies).  
25 See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1010–11 (1986) (discussing scholarship on the Supreme Court’s 
antidifferentiation approach to law); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771, 774–75 (2010) 
(summarizing feminist critiques of Ruth Bader Ginsburg); Williams, supra note 6, at 279–80 
(discussing the special treatment/equal treatment debate). 
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scrutiny.26 The Article explains how these overlooked cases provide the 
constitutional basis for justifying the use of fatherhood bonuses. 
Standing somewhere in the soft middle between rational basis review 
and strict scrutiny, the constitutional test for illegal sex discrimination 
depends on whether a sex classification substantially advances an important 
governmental objective.27 As the Supreme Court has made clear in its more 
recent case law in this area, policies that rely on harmful, gender-based 
stereotypes will fail this test.28 Conversely, the Court has approved of 
special treatment laws that favor one sex over the other when they 
effectively confront age-old gender stereotypes and advance an 
antisubordination agenda.29 This Article explains why fatherhood bonuses 
would achieve both ends. 
The study of masculinities informs the constitutional inquiry by 
highlighting the stereotypes that fatherhood bonuses would confront. 
Masculinities theory—an interdisciplinary field of gender studies that did 
not exist during the 1970s when the Supreme Court forged its modern line 
of sex equality cases—explains how male identity is formed through a 
complex set of gender-based expectations.30 In contrast to certain strands of 
legal feminism that tend to depict men solely as static objects of 
domination,31 masculinities theory attempts to understand men as gendered 
beings who are simultaneously privileged and subordinated by 
masculinity.32 Drawing from this relatively new body of gender theory, this 
Article explains how the rules of manhood call on men to avoid care work, 
thereby saddling women with domestic chores. When applied to the 
Supreme Court’s test for permissible instances of special treatment, the 
 
26 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 
U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).  
27 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
28 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1334–35 (2012) (plurality opinion); 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
542–46 (1996). 
29 See, e.g., Califano, 430 U.S. at 318 (approving of sex-based classifications to combat “the 
socialization process of a male-dominated culture” (quoting Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353)). 
30 See Michael Kimmel, Foreword to MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
APPROACH, at xiv (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) (discussing the history of 
masculinities theory); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 
33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 585–87 (2010) (outlining the basic features of masculinities theory).  
31 JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 
144 (2010) (critiquing dominance feminism’s failure to distinguish between men and masculinity); 
Dowd, supra note 11, at 204 (commenting on the essentialized depiction of men); Nancy Levit, 
Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1049–51 
(1996) (discussing the limited role men play in postmodern feminism). 
32 See NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 2–3 (2010) 
(describing the “power, privilege, and the burdens of masculinity”). 
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study of masculinities helps explain how men’s gender performances harm 
women, and why fatherhood bonuses satisfy the antistereotyping, 
antisubordination principles expressed in the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence. 
This Article advances the case for fatherhood bonuses in four parts. 
Part I explains the nature of maternal profiling and how certain countries 
have enacted fatherhood bonuses to combat this form of bias against both 
mothers and childless women. Part II considers fatherhood bonuses in light 
of feminist theory and the Supreme Court’s often ignored cases that 
sanctioned sex discrimination. This Part demonstrates how the Supreme 
Court’s focus on remediation, subordination, and stereotypes in its equal 
protection rulings leaves room for certain discriminatory laws that extend 
legal rights exclusively to men to expand workplace opportunities for 
women. Part III brings the study of masculinities into the discussion by 
explaining why the problems created by masculine stereotypes demand 
gender-specific solutions. Finally, Part IV offers a sketch of how 
fatherhood bonuses could operate in the U.S. context. Unlike the state-
based grants of Europe, a U.S. system must draw from the American values 
of autonomy and choice in its design and implementation. To that end, a 
father-targeted policy ought to incentivize male caregiving without 
imposing disproportionate costs on employers, beneficiaries, and childless 
employees. The American approach must account for different parental 
arrangements, such as single parents and same-sex couples, while making 
the broader case to childless workers that by combatting maternal profiling, 
fatherhood bonuses advance the goal of gender equality for all workers.33 
The Supreme Court has made clear that sex discrimination is not 
always illegal discrimination.34 In limited circumstances, the Court will 
sanction policies that combat sex-based biases even if the policies 
themselves are discriminatory. Father-targeted leave is one such policy. 
Even though women continue to make tremendous workplace strides, 
domestic responsibilities still hamper their progress at work. These trends 
will not end until men receive sufficient incentives to assume a greater 
share of domestic chores. In short, after all the debates over whether to 
extend special treatment or equal treatment to women, it turns out that 
gender equality depends on extending preferential treatment to men. 
 
33 Brighouse & Wright, supra note 14, at 366 (discussing employers’ views of childless women). 
34 See, e.g., Kahn, 416 U.S. at 356 n.10 (“Gender has never been rejected as an impermissible 
classification in all instances.”). 
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I. PROMOTING WOMEN’S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION WITH 
FATHERHOOD BONUSES 
It might appear that women are finally beating men at their own game. 
Where men once dominated the workplace, women now earn more degrees 
than men, hold more management positions, and constitute a majority of 
professionals.35 Despite these important advancements, however, other 
facts paint a different picture. For example, full-time working women still 
earn about twenty percent less than men each year—a number that barely 
has changed over the last decade.36 In addition, they constitute a small 
minority of executives at large U.S. companies, represent just fifteen 
percent of equity partners at large law firms, and account for less than 
twenty percent of Congress.37 Thus, even with the rise of women at work, 
men still command higher wages in the marketplace and control most of 
society’s levers of power.38 
The gender revolution of the 1970s began to stall in the 1990s and has 
not recovered since.39 In fact, women’s overall workforce participation has 
not increased in two decades, and the percentage of U.S. mothers working 
outside the home has decreased since 1999.40 Today, the primary obstacle 
 
35 BRAD HARRINGTON ET AL., BOS. COLL. CTR. FOR WORK & FAMILY, THE NEW DAD: CARING, 
COMMITTED AND CONFLICTED 3 (2011), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/cwf/
pdf/FH-Study-Web-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/3AQK-6JV3] (discussing women’s educational 
accomplishments); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 
2 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/EL5J-V2HF] 
(listing women’s workplace participation rates); Katie Ziegler, Hitting the Glass Dome, ST. 
LEGISLATURES, July/Aug. 2009, at 30 (describing gains made by women in law, medicine, business, 
and politics).  
36 INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE GENDER WAGE GAP: 2012, at 1–2 (2013), 
available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-wage-gap-2012 [http://perma.cc/95UX-
MBGX].  
37 CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS, WOMEN IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 2014 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/cong.pdf [http://perma.cc/PDR4-
WW5X]; Vivia Chen, The Equity Gap: Survey Shows Slow Progress for Women Partners at Big Firms, 
NAT’L L.J., July 23, 2012, at 1; Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000, supra note 10 (discussing women’s 
representation at Fortune 500 companies). 
38 See CHRYSTIA FREELAND, PLUTOCRATS: THE RISE OF THE NEW GLOBAL SUPER-RICH AND THE 
FALL OF EVERYONE ELSE 85 (2012) (discussing men’s ongoing dominance in upper management).  
39 See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (2003); Williams, 
supra note 12, at 1283 (discussing the relationship between women’s workforce participation and men’s 
household contributions).  
40 See D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AFTER DECADES OF DECLINE, A RISE IN STAY-AT-
HOME MOTHERS 5 (2014), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/04/Moms-At-
Home_04-08-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/6CKE-5B2B] (reporting that the share of mothers who do not 
work outside the home increased from twenty-three percent to twenty-nine percent between 1999 and 
2012); NEIL GILBERT, A MOTHER’S WORK: HOW FEMINISM, THE MARKET, AND POLICY SHAPE FAMILY 
LIFE 14–16 (2008); Family Leave—U.S., Canada, and Global, CATALYST (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/family-leave-us-canada-and-global [http://perma.cc/JXR8-5VNL]; 
(discussing gender-based workforce departures); see also Stephanie Coontz, Progress at Work, but 
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holding women back at work is not a “glass ceiling” but a “maternal wall,” 
a barrier that casts a shadow over all female workers, including childless 
women.41 
A. Caregiving and Maternal Profiling 
Most women’s careers flatline the moment they have children. A 
comparison of the wages earned by mothers and others best captures this 
fact. Today, young men and women without children make roughly the 
same amount of money.42 In fact, childless women in their twenties now 
earn more than men in the vast majority of U.S. cities.43 But as parenthood 
approaches, these trends reverse. The pay gap between men and women 
becomes dramatically wider around the age of thirty-five, which for many 
women is the moment when the demands of childcare, parental leave, and 
career advancement converge.44 
Domesticity—the belief that women should bear the brunt of domestic 
responsibilities and childcare obligations—still influences a great deal of 
each sex’s parenting behaviors.45 Even though many women feel 
ambivalent about motherhood and the caregiving imperatives associated 
with that role, domesticity places a cultural expectation on all women to 
downgrade their market work and become the caregiving center of their 
families’ lives once they have children.46 In fact, the majority of women 
adhere to this norm by departing from the workforce in whole or in part 
after they become mothers.47 
 
Mothers Still Pay a Price, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at SR5 (reviewing data related to women’s 
workplace progress over the past half-century). 
41 See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers 
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 77 (2003) (discussing 
motherhood and the glass ceiling). 
42 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733, 736 (2011) (“[U]ntil 
burdened by parenthood, women have closed the wage gap.”). 
43 JUNE E. O’NEILL & DAVE M. O’NEILL, THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF RACE AND GENDER IN 
THE LABOR MARKET: THE ROLE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 239 (2012) (discussing 
childless women’s earnings); Richard Dorment, Why Men Still Can’t Have It All, ESQUIRE, June/July 
2013, at 126. 
44 AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 10, at 12–13 (explaining how the pay gap differs by 
age). See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family 
Initiatives in a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345, 352–53 (2003) (examining the 
relationship between women’s caregiving and workplace barriers). 
45 See de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 308 (discussing domesticity’s restrictive features).  
46 See Lindsay R. B. Dickerson, “Your Wife Should Handle It”: The Implicit Messages of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 433–34 (2005) (reviewing SUSAN J. 
DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND 
HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN 204–10 (2004)) (discussing domesticity in the media). 
47 See generally Williams, supra note 12, at 1283 (examining the labor market effects of 
motherhood). 
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Many employers observe these behaviors and expect that all female 
candidates will someday reduce their workplace involvement, regardless of 
the actual intent or behavior of any individual female worker.48 Scholars 
dub this form of bias “statistical discrimination” and describe it as a 
rational form of decisionmaking due to its relative validity in predicting the 
behaviors of most women.49 In a world in which employers seek to sort job 
applicants using convenient proxies, maternal profiling enables businesses 
to gauge the input costs that the average woman tends to generate for her 
group.50 
The primary victims of maternal profiling, of course, are mothers 
themselves whom employers assume lack the same level of workplace 
commitment as childless workers.51 Consistent with this presumption, a 
number of social science experiments have demonstrated that once women 
have children, employers extend them fewer promotions and other 
workplace rewards.52 The most famous laboratory experiment on this topic 
presented a group of employers with the résumés of two women applying 
for marketing positions and asked the employers whether they would hire 
each applicant.53 Each woman’s résumé was functionally identical to the 
other; however, one listed the applicant’s parental status and PTA work, 
while the other résumé listed the woman’s marital status and work in the 
local neighborhood association.54 In other words, one applicant was a 
mother, while the other was not. Even though the résumés were the same in 
all other respects, eighty-four percent of employers offered the childless 
woman a job, while only forty-seven percent of employers agreed to hire 
the equally qualified mother.55 Likewise, the employers offered the mother 
an average of $11,000 less in starting salary.56 
 
48 See Selmi, supra note 15, at 744–45 (explaining how employers rely on group observations). 
49 See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 443–44 (discussing the function of statistical discrimination). 
50 See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 834–38 (2001) 
(arguing that the law ought to restrict only “market-irrational” discrimination). 
51 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine 
Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253, 261–62 (2013) (discussing family 
responsibilities discrimination). 
52 Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1359 
(2008) (summarizing studies related to “maternal wall” discrimination); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie 
Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the 
Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1327–28 (2008) (same). 
53 Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 
1309–12 (2007). 
54 Id. at 1313.  
55 Id. at 1316 (noting that employers judged mothers as significantly less competent than childless 
women). 
56 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
12 
Beyond the negative effects of statistical discrimination on mothers, 
however, even childless women suffer from the perception that at some 
point in the future they will perform the bulk of their family’s work. 
Because statistical discrimination is based on an employee’s likely 
behaviors, employers project expected actions onto group members even if 
individual members of that group have no intention of conforming to the 
group norm.57 Given that maternal profiling masks over distinctions among 
group members, employers may even view childless women as risky 
employees who will someday assume excessive caregiving duties.58 As 
such, the harm of maternal profiling extends not only to women with 
children, but also to any woman of childbearing years. 
B. The Failure of Gender-Neutral Leave in the United States 
Despite Americans’ general skepticism of governmental interventions 
in the domestic sphere,59 Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) as an explicit, policy-based attempt to combat maternal 
profiling by encouraging greater gender equity in the home.60 Enacted in 
1993, the FMLA contained legislative findings that noted women’s 
disproportionate caregiving burdens and the widespread discrimination that 
flowed from domesticity.61 By extending family leave to both men and 
women, Congress attempted to remove the target that sat squarely on 
women’s backs as the sole users of parental leave.62 
Unfortunately, twenty years of experience demonstrates that the 
FMLA has done little to break longstanding sex-based patterns of care in 
the United States. Recent data on men’s and women’s leave-taking rates 
show how gender-based norms continue to dictate caregiving behaviors. 
Today the average father in the United States leaves work for one week or 
less following his child’s birth or adoption.63 In contrast, new mothers take 
nearly two months more parental leave than fathers.64 These initial 
 
57 See Kaminer, supra note 8, at 313–14 (discussing each sex’s working patterns); Palazzari, supra 
note 12, at 436–37 (examining sex-based divisions of labor).  
58 See Brighouse & Wright, supra note 14, at 366 (outlining gender-regulating social norms). 
59 Gayle Kaufman et al., Post-Birth Employment Leave Among Fathers in Britain and the United 
States, 8 FATHERING 321, 324 (2010) (explaining why the United States has enacted few social policies 
relating to the family). 
60 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2012).  
61 Id. (“[T]he primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women . . . .”). 
62 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1340 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the FMLA’s legislative history). 
63 Kaufman et al., supra note 59, at 328; Lenna Nepomnyaschy & Jane Waldfogel, Paternity Leave 
and Fathers’ Involvement with Their Young Children, 10 COMMUNITY, WORK & FAM. 427, 446–47 
(2007). 
64 Naomi Gerstel & Amy Armenia, Giving and Taking Family Leaves: Right or Privilege?, 
21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 167 (2009). 
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allocations of time quickly morph into long-term habits at home. Among 
two-parent, opposite-sex couples, a father’s decision to return quickly to 
work automatically casts the mother as the family’s caregiving expert.65 As 
time goes by, each parent’s level of labor specialization grows. The mother 
develops better caregiving skills, while losing ground in the marketplace. 
In contrast, the father becomes a secondary caregiver who “helps out” 
around the house.66 
These familiar gender roles become self-fulfilling prophecies as both 
mothers and fathers come to perceive the mother as the more 
knowledgeable, competent parent.67 Thus, the father’s lack of human 
capital investment during the crucial period of parental leave leads to the 
perception—real or imagined—that he lacks the aptitude to provide 
primary care during later stages of childrearing.68 As such, the gender-
based identities forged during the initial stages of parental leave yield 
entrenched divisions of labor as children grow older.69 Today, for example, 
mothers in dual-income couples perform nearly twice the amount of 
childcare as fathers, while men with children spend eleven more hours per 
week in paid labor than mothers.70 
Scholars have tried to explain why the FMLA failed to yield more 
gender-egalitarian outcomes.71 They have argued, for example, that men 
have declined to take significant amounts of parental leave due to employer 
resistance, social stigma, retaliation, coverage limitations, and an inability 
to afford the FMLA’s unpaid benefits.72 Although each item on this list 
 
65 See Iman Syeda Ali, Bringing Down the “Maternal Wall”: Reforming the FMLA to Provide 
Equal Employment Opportunities for Caregivers, 27 LAW & INEQ. 181, 200–01 (2009) (explaining how 
fathers assume a “secondary role” in childrearing). 
66 See Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 
86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1276 (2011) (examining the connection between leave-taking patterns and gender 
roles).  
67 See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 442–43 (discussing the FMLA’s effects on women). 
68 See Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 26 (discussing men’s failure to develop human capital in 
caregiving tasks). 
69 Id.; see also Brighouse & Wright, supra note 14, at 366–67 (explaining how each parent’s 
perceived competences develop). 
70 PARKER & WANG, supra note 13, at 3–4; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MARRIED PARENTS’ 
USE OF TIME, 2003–06 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus2.pdf [http://
perma.cc/PQU4-ULP6]. 
71 See, e.g., Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values 
and Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 95 
(2000) (discussing male leave-taking rates); Dickerson, supra note 46, at 438–39 (noting that gendered 
social norms affect decisions related to both parental leave and parenting). For an examination of men’s 
family leave usage, see Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1049 
(1994). 
72 See Bornstein, supra note 71, at 95 (examining structures that discourage leave-taking among 
men); Dickerson, supra note 46, at 438–39 (summarizing the scholarly debate over men’s infrequent 
use of family leave). 
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undoubtedly contributes to the problem, far less attention has been paid to 
the FMLA’s failure to target men specifically.73 In contrast to the U.S. 
experience, in which the FMLA’s gender-neutral approach has yielded 
gender-skewed results, other nations have begun to utilize gender-targeted 
policies to help equalize divisions of labor at home. After years of 
experimentation, these countries have found that not even generously paid 
leave provides men with sufficient incentives to stay home with 
newborns.74 Rather, these countries have found that fatherhood bonuses 
represent the most effective method for counterbalancing the marketplace 
harms of maternal profiling. 
C. “Velvet Dad” to Every Dad: Scandinavia’s Success with  
Fatherhood Bonuses 
Paid leave is nothing new to Sweden. Long known for its extensive 
support of families through early education programs, state-sponsored 
childcare, and generous family leave provisions, Sweden stands as a global 
model for providing state support to working parents.75 For example, in 
1974, Sweden became the first country in the world to offer fathers paid 
parental leave.76 Soon after implementing the law, however, government 
officials discovered that very few men actually used the policy. Despite 
publicity campaigns encouraging men to stay home, less than ten percent of 
Swedish fathers took paternity leave, and society applied the derogatory 
label “velvet dads” to men who took leave.77 Men’s low use of parental 
leave contributed to a familiar cycle of gender-norm reinforcement in 
which Swedish women took leave at far higher rates and suffered wage 
 
73 See Bornstein, supra note 71, at 115 (discussing the FMLA’s gender neutrality); Christine G. 
Cooper, The Search for Sex Equality: A Perspective from the Podium on Law and Cultural Change, 
36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 445–46 (2005) (same). For proposals advocating in favor of gender-neutral 
policies that encourage male leave-taking, see Ariel Meysam Ayanna, Aggressive Parental Leave 
Incentivizing: A Statutory Proposal Toward Gender Equalization in the Workplace, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 293, 293–94 (2007); and Selmi, supra note 15, at 773–74. For a sex-specific proposal that 
targets women, see Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About “Women”?, 1 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 36 (1991). 
74 See generally INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 35–38 
(describing recent attempts to incentivize fathers’ use of leave).  
75 See Nancy E. Dowd, Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 219, 
234 (2004) (describing Sweden’s commitment to gender equality). 
76 See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 104 (2010) (discussing Sweden’s workplace policies); Linda Haas & C. Philip 
Hwang, The Impact of Taking Parental Leave on Fathers’ Participation in Childcare and Relationships 
with Children: Lessons from Sweden, 11 COMMUNITY, WORK & FAM. 85, 86 (2008) (same).  
77 See Bennhold, supra note 22 (describing Sweden’s success with encouraging men to take “daddy 
leave”). 
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disparities in the marketplace. Swedish men, in turn, came to believe that 
“velvet dads” were committing career suicide.78 
Aware that the country’s existing parental leave policy caused women 
to experience extended departures from the labor force, the Swedish 
government made parents an irresistible offer in 1995: families would 
receive an additional month of leave if fathers utilized thirty days of paid 
leave that the state reserved exclusively for them.79 Known in Sweden as 
the “daddy month,” the bonus depended entirely on whether men took 
leave, and fathers could not transfer the bonus to their female partners.80 
This clever bit of social engineering quickly produced dramatic results. 
Soon after the daddy month became law, the proportion of men who took 
leave during their child’s first two years increased from forty percent to 
seventy-five percent.81 When Sweden added a second month in 2002, the 
rate of men taking leave jumped to ninety percent by 2006.82 Men spent 
more time away from work as well, with over half of fathers taking more 
than thirty days of leave, and with mothers’ use of leave decreasing by an 
average of twenty days.83 
It is now common to see fathers pushing strollers during the business 
day in cities such as Stockholm and Gothenburg. In Sweden’s famous 
Djurgården Park, which lies in the shadow of some of the country’s most 
prominent financial institutions, scores of fathers now sit chatting, 
changing diapers, and performing the type of domestic work traditionally 
associated with mothers.84 These shifts have triggered tremendous social 
transformations in a remarkably short amount of time. Since 1995, when 
Sweden offered the first daddy month, divorce rates in the country have 
dropped and shared custody arrangements have increased.85 Horizontal 
 
78 See id. (discussing social signals in Sweden). 
79 EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, LEAVES THAT PAY: EMPLOYER AND WORKER 
EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 17 (2011), available at http://www.cepr.net/
documents/publications/paid-family-leave-1-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BDW-YYVT]; Brighouse & 
Wright, supra note 14, at 370 n.5 (analyzing the one month of “father-only” leave). Although Sweden 
also introduced a nontransferable “‘mummy’ month” in 1995, men remained the primary targets of 
Sweden’s family leave policy. See Ann-Zofie Duvander & Mats Johansson, What Are the Effects of 
Reforms Promoting Fathers’ Parental Leave Use?, 22 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 319, 320–25 (2012) (stating 
that incentives for women had little effect on mothers’ behaviors). 
80 Doucet, supra note 21 (noting that Sweden offered men a second “daddy month” in 2002).  
81 Duvander & Johansson, supra note 79, at 324–25. 
82 Linda Haas & C. Philip Hwang, Is Fatherhood Becoming More Visible at Work? Trends in 
Corporate Support for Fathers Taking Parental Leave in Sweden, 7 FATHERING 303, 314 (2009); see 
also de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 326–27 (summarizing Sweden’s father-based incentives). 
83 Duvander & Johansson, supra note 79, at 325. 
84 See Jens Hansegard, For Paternity Leave, Sweden Asks if Two Months Is Enough, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 1, 2012, at D1 (describing political debates within Sweden over family leave). 
85 Bennhold, supra note 22 (noting that divorce rates in other countries increased during this time). 
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equity between mothers and other workers improved as well.86 For 
example, one recent study of Sweden’s policy showed that women’s 
earnings increased by seven percent for every month of parental leave that 
fathers took.87 Likewise, Swedish men who took longer leaves ended up 
spending more time with their children on work days and engaged in a 
greater share of certain caregiving tasks.88 Although these outcomes merely 
correlate with Sweden’s use of fatherhood bonuses—as opposed to 
establishing any definitive causative link—the fact that several measures of 
gender equity improved in Sweden after the country adopted fatherhood 
bonuses suggests that these policies may play an important role in 
narrowing gender-based gaps. 
Father-targeted leave appears to have benefited families in Norway as 
well, which in 1993 set aside four weeks of paid leave exclusively for 
fathers through fedrekvoten (fathers’ quota).89 Since implementation of 
fedrekvoten, which recently increased the amount of leave available 
exclusively to fathers to twelve weeks,90 the country has seen men’s usage 
jump from four percent to ninety percent.91 In an experimental study 
comparing parents prior to and following implementation of the policy, 
researchers found that Norwegian parents exposed to fedrekvoten were 
eleven percent less likely to experience conflicts over divisions of labor and 
fifty percent more likely to equally divide the task of clothes washing.92 
Of course, plenty of sex discrimination still remains in these 
Scandinavian countries, and mothers still take significantly more leave than 
fathers. For example, in eighty percent of Swedish couples, men use one-
third of the leave benefit.93 Likewise, large segments of industries remain 
sex-segregated, and a significant wage gap persists.94 Nonetheless, it is 
difficult to understate the transformations that have occurred in Swedish 
 
86 See Duvander & Johansson, supra note 79, at 323 (examining horizontal equity among workers). 
87 Bennhold, supra note 22 (discussing the relationship between a person’s education level and the 
likelihood of taking parental leave). 
88 Haas & Hwang, supra note 76, at 99 (reporting that Swedish fathers who took more leave 
reported higher levels of satisfaction with childcare). 
89 See Andreas Kotsadam & Henning Finseraas, The State Intervenes in the Battle of the Sexes: 
Causal Effects of Paternity Leave, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 1611, 1611 (2011) (discussing Norway’s system). 
90 INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 210; Leah Eichler, The 
Case for a “Daddy Quota,” GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 13, 2013, at B19 (summarizing data suggesting the 
positive effect “daddy quotas” have on women’s careers). 
91 INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 210. 
92 Kotsadam & Finseraas, supra note 89, at 1612. 
93 Anca Gheaus & Ingrid Robeyns, Equality-Promoting Parental Leave, 42 J. SOC. PHIL. 173, 173 
(2011) (explaining how women’s disproportionate use of leave depresses women’s lifetime earnings); 
Bennhold, supra note 22 (examining existing gender asymmetries in Scandinavia). 
94 See Dowd, supra note 75, at 235 (discussing gender integration in Swedish businesses); Haas & 
Hwang, supra note 76, at 90 (attributing the pay gap in Sweden to women’s concentration in 
undervalued industries).  
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and Norwegian homes since the countries introduced fatherhood bonuses 
less than two decades ago. 
Although the foregoing examples may seem inapplicable to the 
American context, the United States does not need to become Sweden in 
order to incentivize male caregiving. Indeed, countries with economic 
systems more analogous to the United States, such as Canada and 
Germany, have also successfully experimented with fatherhood bonuses. 
As these examples illustrate, even modest fatherhood bonuses can trigger a 
great deal of change in men’s leave-taking behavior. 
D. The Globalization of Father-Targeted Leave 
As the first country in the world to offer maternity leave, Germany has 
a long history of dealing with the effects of work–family policies on 
divisions of household labor.95 Although German legislators originally 
designed the country’s parental leave system with mothers in mind, 
lawmakers recently began to notice how women’s disproportionate use of 
leave negatively affected their labor force participation.96 Indeed, during the 
past decade, female workers in Germany experienced higher rates of 
unemployment and longer periods away from their careers than women in 
other parts of Europe.97 Cognizant of women’s lagging workplace 
representation and asymmetrical divisions of labor at home, German 
policymakers drastically reformed the nation’s parental leave policy in 
2007 with the goal of getting men more involved.98 
Pursuant to the country’s Elterngeld (parental benefit) system, families 
now receive two extra months of paid parental leave when fathers take 
leave as well.99 There is no mandate requiring men to use Germany’s leave 
system, but if they fail to take leave, their family loses valuable state-
funded benefits. As in other countries, German men now take leave at far 
higher rates due to this change. Six years after Germany implemented this 
policy, the proportion of German fathers taking leave jumped from 3.3 
percent to 27.8 percent.100 The majority of leave-taking fathers in Germany 
now take an average of two months off from work to spend time with their 
children, which represents the minimum amount of time needed to earn an 
 
95 See Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 4 (examining the history of maternity leave in Germany).  
96 See Jochen Kluve & Marcus Tamm, Parental Leave Regulations, Mothers’ Labor Force 
Attachment and Fathers’ Childcare Involvement: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 26 J. 
POPULATION ECON. 983, 986–87 (2012) (examining Germany’s parental leave regulations). 
97 Id. at 987 (discussing the rationale for the Elterngeld system).  
98 See id. at 984–85 (explaining that Germany adopted fatherhood bonuses as an explicit attempt to 
encourage men to stay home); Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 26 (summarizing research showing that 
German men suffered no negative consequences from taking leave).  
99 INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 129–30. 
100 Id. at 132. 
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equivalent bonus for their families.101 These results show how paid leave 
combined with well-designed incentives can effectively combat gender 
stratification. Indeed, the fact that German fathers who utilize the policy 
now take nearly the same amount of parental leave as U.S. mothers 
demonstrates the power of these policies.102 
Fatherhood bonuses have worked in North America as well. In fact, 
some of the most exciting developments on this front have occurred in 
Québec, which recently began reserving a period of paid leave exclusively 
for fathers.103 Since 2006, fathers in Québec can take up to five weeks of 
leave, plus additional time that they can share with their partners.104 Funded 
through the province’s Parental Insurance Plan, Québec’s leave policy 
compensates men at higher income replacement rates than Canada’s 
national parental leave law.105 Similar to outcomes in other countries that 
have embraced fatherhood bonuses, the rate of fathers taking leave in 
Québec skyrocketed from twenty-two percent to eighty-four percent just 
five years after the province adopted father-targeted leave.106 Attesting to 
the influence of the policy on fathers, Québec men take parental leave at a 
rate over seventy percent higher than the rest of Canadian men who have no 
father-targeted leave available to them.107 As in Norway and Sweden, data 
related to the correlation between these policies and men’s uptake of 
housework show how fatherhood bonuses promote gender egalitarianism. 
For example, a study of Québec’s policy found that fathers exposed to the 
new law spent less time at their workplaces and increased their 
contributions to household work.108 Likewise, mothers exposed to the 
reform spent more time in paid work.109 
Given the encouraging success stories coming from Sweden, Norway, 
Germany, and Canada, more countries around the world are adopting 
policies that promote “fatherhood by gentle force.”110 Currently, seven 
nations offer some kind of bonus to fathers who take parental leave, and 
 
101 Id. at 133–34; Kluve & Tamm, supra note 96, at 1004; Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 14–15 
(suggesting that Germany’s example shows that fatherhood bonuses work outside of the Scandinavian 
context). 
102 See Gerstel & Armenia, supra note 64, at 167 (reporting that American women take seventy-six 
days for newborn care on average). 
103 See Tremblay, supra note 22, at 226–27 (comparing Québec’s plan to the rest of Canada). 
104 Id. (explaining the importance of high-income wage replacement in parental leave policies). 
105 Id. at 226. 
106 INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 78. 
107 Doucet, supra note 21 (noting that roughly twelve percent of men take parental leave in the rest 
of Canada). 
108 Patnaik, supra note 23, at 4–5.  
109 Id. at 3–4. 
110 See de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 326–27 (discussing the expansion of fatherhood 
bonuses). 
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other countries are actively considering similar measures.111 The United 
States can and should join this international movement by enacting its own 
fatherhood bonuses. States such as California, New Jersey, and Rhode 
Island now offer partially paid leave to parents,112 and the United States’ 
status as the only industrialized nation in the world without paid parental 
leave can last only so long.113 After all, given that international 
competitiveness depends largely on a country’s ability to efficiently 
employ human capital, the United States simply cannot afford policies like 
the FMLA that underutilize the country’s highly educated female 
workforce.114 But paid leave alone will not be enough. As the experiences 
in the aforementioned countries indicate, the methods by which parental 
leave laws allocate benefits between men and women largely determine 
whether such policies actually dismantle gender hierarchies or simply 
reconstitute them. Therefore, in order to loosen the burdens that 
domesticity places on women, while encouraging greater male involvement 
at home, a parental leave policy in the United States must target fathers. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Fatherhood bonuses would undoubtedly face a high constitutional 
hurdle in the United States. Were the federal government to enact a law 
extending additional weeks of paid leave to parents on the condition that 
fathers take some amount of leave time, such a law might appear facially 
discriminatory and thus presumptively unconstitutional under the 
conventional approach to equal protection.115 To understand why, this 
section examines and unpacks several misunderstood strands of equal 
protection jurisprudence and feminist legal theory. 
 
111 INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 17, 35 (describing 
different systems that incentivize male leave-taking). 
112 See Brigid Schulte, States Make Moves Toward Paying for Family Leave, WASH. POST, Dec. 
30, 2013, at A3 (discussing different jurisdictions that have enacted paid leave legislation); see also 
Nanette Fondas, Why Paid Family Leave Is Good for Everyone (Even People Who Don’t Use It), 
ATLANTIC, July 8, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/07/why-paid-family-leave-is-
good-for-everyone-even-people-who-dont-use-it/277577/ [http://perma.cc/FZE4-ZTBH] (discussing the 
connection between family leave legislation and workplace bias against women).  
113 See Nina G. Golden, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave: Taking Baby Steps Towards Effective 
Policies, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 1 (2006) (critiquing the FMLA).  
114 See Catherine Rampell, Lean In, Dad, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 7, 2013, at 18 (outlining the 
economic case for father-targeted leave). 
115 See Ayanna, supra note 73, at 299 (discussing the “questionable constitutionality” of mandatory 
paternity leave); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s 
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
371, 438–39 (2001) (discussing the prominence of formal equality in legal decisionmaking and 
highlighting its limitations). 
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Most accounts of the Supreme Court’s modern sex discrimination 
rulings describe the Justices’ rigid commitment to formal equality.116 
According to this view, whenever the Justices encounter a law that treats 
similarly situated men and women differently, they strike it down. 
Corresponding to this narrative is a related description of ongoing debates 
within legal feminism. As this story goes, the issue of whether to adopt 
public policies designed specifically for women has split feminists between 
two hostile camps: one group committed to formal equality that advances 
the “equal treatment” of women (sameness feminists), the other favoring 
policies that aim for equity by extending “special treatment” to women 
such as paid maternity leave (difference feminists).117 Most gender theorists 
now conclude that sameness feminists have won the debate in practice, 
even though difference feminists outnumber them.118 
This section critiques the foregoing debate for failing to properly 
delineate the actual boundaries of permissible “special treatment” as 
defined by the Supreme Court’s rulings in this area. Rather than utilize a 
formalist, line-drawing approach to equal protection, the Court has focused 
on whether certain laws perpetuate negative stereotypes about women that 
further their subordination.119 In instances where the Court has allowed the 
state to act upon sex-based differences, it has carefully distinguished 
between laws that presume women’s domesticity and those that do not.120 
By analyzing how these decisions define the parameters of acceptable 
discrimination, a new vision of the Court’s sex equality jurisprudence 
begins to take form. 
A. Feminist Theory and Special Treatment 
By the late 1970s, feminism in the United States stood at a strategic 
crossroads. Following a decade of legislative victories in which Congress 
had outlawed sex discrimination in pay121 and employment,122 for example, 
advocates for women’s rights had to decide whether to continue advancing 
a legislative agenda focused exclusively on the similarities between the 
 
116 See Colker, supra note 25, at 1010–11 (summarizing the conventional narrative on the Court’s 
sex equality jurisprudence). 
117 See Dinner, supra note 5, at 444 (criticizing the oversimplified depiction of the sameness–
difference debate). 
118 See Williams, supra note 6, at 279 (calling for greater analytical distinctions in summaries of 
certain debates within legal feminism). 
119 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (barring Virginia from relying upon 
“overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females” 
(citations omitted)).  
120 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (affirming the legislative goal 
of “guarantee[ing] women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce”). 
121 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). 
122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
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sexes, or instead pursue a more nuanced course that recognized certain 
differences between men and women.123 The heated debate over this 
question created fissures within legal feminism that persist to this day.124 
Adopting the rhetoric of equality and liberalism, sameness feminists 
argued that the law should combat discrimination against similarly situated 
equals.125 According to this view, women ought to enjoy all the rights and 
privileges afforded to men, and no more.126 If women received special 
protection for the unique burdens placed upon them by pregnancy, for 
example, sameness feminists feared that such legislation would only 
fragilize women and reinforce existing biases against them. The call to 
formal equality required advocates to downplay certain biological and 
socially constructed differences between the sexes.127 In the process, 
proponents of formal equality articulated an intuitively attractive, justice-
oriented appeal: treat each sex the same, and women will prosper.128 
Difference feminists, on the other hand, sought to highlight women’s 
distinct experiences.129 They pointed out that even though the country 
expressed an official commitment to treating women equally through laws 
such as Title VII130 and the Equal Pay Act,131 formal equality in the law did 
 
123 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1340–42 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Williams, supra note 1, at 86–87 (discussing the different strategies of legal feminists). 
124 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 44, at 350 n.16 (listing scholarly contributions to the 
sameness–difference debate); Williams, supra note 6, at 281; Linda Hassberg, Comment, Toward 
Gender Equality: Testing the Applicability of a Broader Discrimination Standard in the Workplace, 
40 BUFF. L. REV. 217, 222–29 (1992) (outlining divisions within legal feminism). 
125 See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 867–68 (1997) 
(examining arguments in favor of formal equality); see, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the 
Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the 
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985) 
[hereinafter Williams, Equality’s Riddle].  
126 See Bartlett, supra note 5, at 392 (commenting on formal equality’s rhetorical appeal); see also 
John E. Morrison, Viva La Diferencia: A Non-Solution to the Difference Dilemma, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 
973, 974 (1994) (arguing that the sameness–difference debate focused on the meaning of equality). 
127 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 37 (1995) (discussing the prevalence of formal equality 
arguments within feminist debates). 
128 See Bartlett, supra note 5, at 392–93 (describing the tactics used by advocates of formal 
equality); Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 
567, 603–04 (2010) (summarizing the case made by sameness feminists). 
129 See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513, 
514–18 (1983); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1291–
1301 (1987). 
130 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
131 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). 
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not necessarily yield substantive equality at home or at work.132 They 
contended that equal treatment ended up benefiting very few women 
because it ignored real differences between women’s lives and men’s.133 
According to this view, neutral rules aided only the rare woman whose life 
was identical to a man’s, but did little to assist the vast majority of women 
who encountered structural, gender-based barriers throughout society.134 
Even though scholars often framed the sameness–difference debate in 
normative terms (i.e., should women enjoy sex-specific rights?), the 
conflict was actually more about strategy than ideology.135 Proponents of 
both strands of feminism shared the common goal of counteracting the 
negative effects of domesticity.136 They simply disagreed as to whether 
special treatment would compensate women for gender-based harms or, 
instead, reinscribe underlying stereotypes. Despite the robust scholarly 
debate over whether the law ought to favor women in certain instances, 
however, the design of the female-specific rights involved in the debate 
remained surprisingly deemphasized. Thus, even though feminists engaged 
in a legislative and legal dispute over the proper policies for promoting 
gender equity, the discussion did not yield many concrete proposals as to 
how women might actually enjoy special treatment in the real world. 
The few legislative proposals that did emerge, however, say quite a bit 
about the limited vision of special treatment that each side had in mind—
one that focused on pregnancy and entailed three distinct legislative 
enactments: (1) the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA);137 (2) state laws 
granting mothers unique rights; and (3) the FMLA.138 
 
132 See, e.g., Krieger & Cooney, supra note 129, at 541–42 (critiquing the equal treatment 
approach); Littleton, supra note 129, at 1302 (characterizing an assimilationist model of feminism as 
“fatally phallocentric”). 
133 See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC 
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 2–6 (1991) (discussing special treatment in the context of family 
law); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT 12 (1982) (discussing men’s and women’s different moral systems); Robin West, 
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1988) (examining how cultural feminism 
characterizes women’s caregiving).  
134 See Bartlett, supra note 5, at 392–93 (noting that the issue of pregnancy crystallized the debate 
over special treatment); see also Abrams, supra note 125, at 869–70 (discussing the appeal made by 
difference feminists). 
135 See Dinner, supra note 5, at 444 (outlining strategic differences between different feminist 
camps); Williams, supra note 6, at 284–85 (examining various branches of the sameness–difference 
debate).  
136 See Dinner, supra note 5, at 444 (calling for a more nuanced understanding of the sameness–
difference debate).  
137 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). 
138 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2012). 
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B. The Legislative Evolution of Equal Treatment 
Passage of the PDA in 1978 created a moment of convergence in the 
sameness–difference debate. At the time of the PDA’s enactment, many 
U.S. employers maintained a regular habit of firing pregnant women.139 
After the Supreme Court ruled that federal law did not prohibit this 
practice,140 both sameness feminists and difference feminists found an issue 
that they could agree on: pregnancy should not enable employers to issue 
pink slips to women. Accordingly, both sides galvanized support for 
passage of the PDA, which prohibited pregnancy discrimination in 
employment and compelled businesses that already offered disability plans 
to extend disability benefits to pregnant women as well.141 The PDA 
constituted a victory for sameness feminists who convinced Congress to 
mandate “pregnancy-blindness” throughout American companies.142 That 
is, the law did not require employers to provide pregnant women with 
pregnancy leave.143 Rather, employers had to cover pregnant women only if 
they allowed other employees to take disability leave as well.144 
In the early 1980s, however, sameness and difference feminists began 
to part ways when some state legislators went a step further and enacted 
legislation that forced businesses to provide leave benefits to new 
mothers.145 Supporting these laws, difference feminists attempted to 
distinguish modern, mother-specific enactments from the paternalism of an 
earlier era.146 They recalled the Supreme Court’s history of utilizing sexist 
rationalizations to restrict women’s workplace opportunities during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.147 For example, in 1872, the Court 
affirmed a state ban on female lawyers in Bradwell v. Illinois because, 
according to Justice Bradley, “The natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
 
139 See Grossman, supra note 128, at 610 (discussing pregnancy discrimination in the United 
States). 
140 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
141 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. at 2076. 
142 Grossman, supra note 128, at 610.  
143 See Bartlett, supra note 5, at 393 (noting that the PDA reflected the equal treatment position).  
144 Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 77 (1997) (arguing 
that “[t]he PDA is, at most, an equal treatment model for pregnant women”); Issacharoff & Rosenblum, 
supra note 18, at 2181–82 (noting that the PDA never mandated leave for women). 
145 See Littleton, supra note 73, at 24 (asserting that the “salutary nature” of the debate broke down 
soon after the PDA’s passage); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, 
Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 193 (1982) (noting that all feminist groups 
supported passage of the PDA). 
146 See Suk, supra note 7, at 47–49 (discussing the relationship between second wave feminism and 
employment legislation). 
147 See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a ban on female bartenders); see 
also ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED 
STATES 186–214 (1982) (summarizing the protective legislation of the early twentieth century).  
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which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the 
occupations of civil life.”148 Similarly, the Court’s 1908 decision in Muller 
v. Oregon upheld a state law that limited the hours of female laundry 
workers due to women’s “physical structure and the performance of 
maternal functions.”149 The shadow of Bradwell and Muller loomed over 
the maternity leave debates of the 1980s. 
Although the older forms of protective legislation ended up 
“protecting” women out of the workforce, difference feminists contended 
that modern maternity leave laws actually advanced women’s careers by 
allowing them to keep their jobs once they became mothers.150 They argued 
that, at the very least, society should recognize real biological differences 
in the area of reproduction.151 According to this view, if society wanted 
men and women to enjoy equal access to market work, then the law ought 
to equalize women’s starting positions by compensating them for short 
workplace departures that result from pregnancy.152 
Meanwhile, sameness feminists predicted that these protective laws 
would actually reinscribe the strictures of domesticity.153 They argued that 
history was on their side because special treatment had too often served as 
a proxy for exclusion.154 If parental leave became known as a “women’s 
issue,” coworkers would resent mothers and employers would feel more 
comfortable relegating women to lower-tier jobs.155 In essence, critics 
feared that maternity leave laws would recast women, once again, as less-
than-ideal workers who should remain at home.156 
Ruling in favor of sex-specific rights, the Supreme Court sided with 
difference feminists by holding that state legislatures could in fact require 
 
148 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).  
149 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). 
150 See Littleton, supra note 73, at 27 (examining the historical context of protective legislation); 
Williams, Equality’s Riddle, supra note 125, at 334 (discussing the harms caused by protective 
legislation). 
151 See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984) 
(criticizing an approach to equality that denies biological differences between the sexes). 
152 Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 18, at 2198–99; Hassberg, supra note 124, at 223 
(discussing the limitations of formal equality). 
153 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1341–42 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (summarizing the debate within legal feminism over sex-specific leave legislation). 
154 See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of 
the ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 18–19 (2012) (noting that sameness 
feminists preferred to highlight the commonalties between male and female workers). 
155 See Williams, Equality’s Riddle, supra note 125, at 353, 371 (“Accommodation to parental 
needs and obligations should penetrate to the core of the workplace rather than remain a peripheral 
‘women’s issue.’”).  
156 See Alemzadeh, supra note 154, at 17–18 (describing the historical connection between 
protective legislation and modern maternity leave laws). 
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employers to provide maternity disability leave benefits.157 This decision 
gave rise to what Martha Minow famously called the “dilemma of 
difference.”158 Discussing the conundrum maternity leave laws created, she 
said, “[W]e may recreate difference either by noticing it or by ignoring 
it.”159 For example, any law that overlooks the stereotypes mothers face at 
work might actually strengthen those biases. Conversely, the more that the 
law recognizes differences between women and men, the greater the risk 
that existing forms of discrimination will solidify. 
Following the Supreme Court’s approval of state maternity leave laws, 
sameness feminists turned to Congress for a national, gender-neutral 
solution.160 Broadening the issue beyond the topic of maternity leave, the 
question presented to Congress in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
whether parental leave rights should cover mothers only. This time, 
sameness feminists won the debate when Congress passed the FMLA and 
extended family leave benefits to men and women on equal terms for a 
variety of caregiving reasons.161  
Consistent with the FMLA’s approach to equality, the concept of 
equal treatment appears to dominate today’s legal and judicial landscape.162 
From family law,163 to disability protections,164 to antidiscrimination 
guarantees,165 Congress has crafted nearly all rights in gender-neutral 
terms.166 Mirroring these legislative outcomes, most summaries of the 
Supreme Court’s sex discrimination decisions assert that, like Congress, the 
 
157 See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987); see also infra Part II.C 
and accompanying discussion of the Supreme Court’s special treatment jurisprudence. 
158 MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 3, at 20; Martha Minow, The Supreme 
Court, 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987) [hereinafter 
Minow, Justice Engendered]. 
159 Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 158, at 12. 
160 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1340 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (summarizing the FMLA’s legislative history); Williams, supra note 6, at 279 (explaining 
how equal treatment advocates mobilized support for the FMLA). 
161 See Gerstel & Armenia, supra note 64, at 163 (noting that FMLA supporters celebrated the 
law’s universalism). 
162 See Dinner, supra note 5, at 444 (summarizing the perception that equal treatment feminism had 
prevailed in the debate over women’s rights); Williams, supra note 6, at 279 (discussing the prevalence 
of equal treatment arguments in public policy debates). 
163 See Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 
73, 78–79 (2003) (discussing the “best interests of the child” standard in custody disputes). 
164 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2013); see also Alemzadeh, supra note 154, at 5 (examining the 
treatment of pregnancy in the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
165 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 44, at 350–51 (outlining 
Title VII’s commitment to formal equality). 
166 But see Davis, supra note 163, at 76 (discussing Congress’s limited deviations from sex-blind 
policymaking).  
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Court has placed the equality principle above all others.167 But despite the 
legislative and judicial bent toward formal equality, the Court has also left 
room for certain sex-based classifications to coexist with the country’s 
more celebrated examples of equal treatment. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Sex Discrimination Canon 
The Supreme Court first held that a governmental sex classification 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1971 
with its ruling in Reed v. Reed.168 Despite the momentous nature of this 
decision, however, the Court took decades to define the precise contours of 
the constitutional test for sex discrimination. For example, in Frontiero v. 
Richardson, the Court came within one vote of adopting a strict scrutiny 
test.169 Three years later, the Court settled on intermediate scrutiny in Craig 
v. Boren.170 In 1996, the Court appeared to raise the standard even higher 
when it required states to articulate an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” to enact legislation based on sex.171 
The foregoing chronology represents the classic telling of the Supreme 
Court’s sex-based equal protection jurisprudence. The narrative suggests 
that in striking down sex-based classifications during the latter half of the 
twentieth century, the Court expressed an ever-growing commitment to 
formal equality. Unfortunately, this version of the sex equality canon tells 
only half the story. Just as the Court rejected numerous governmental sex 
classifications during this period, it also permitted many others to stand.172 
Reading the Court’s celebrated equal treatment cases in conjunction 
with its overlooked special treatment decisions provides a far more 
nuanced understanding of sex equality. In fact, the Court never based its 
decisions solely on whether laws created formal groupings, but rather if 
 
167 See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative Action and Reverse Gender Bias: 
Beyond Gratz, Parents Involved, and Ricci, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 2 (2011) (summarizing the 
Court’s “anticlassification” approach to equal protection); Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality 
Theory in Practice: The Inability of Current Antidiscrimination Law to Protect Conventional and 
Unconventional Persons, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 16 (2007). 
168 See 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); see also Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act: Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 
487 (2008) (discussing the history of Reed). 
169 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 740 (2002) (discussing Justice Brennan’s desire to apply a strict scrutiny 
standard to sex discrimination). 
170 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
171 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); see also Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex 
Discount, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1161 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s standard of review for sex 
discrimination “reached its zenith” in Virginia).  
172 See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 
508 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974); see also Buchanan, supra note 171, at 1163 
(discussing limited instances of special treatment). 
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legal classifications relied upon stereotypes that hampered women’s 
advancement.173 This commitment to antistereotyping, antisubordination 
principles can be found both in the Court’s special treatment decisions and 
in the more well-known formal equality rulings. With these common legal 
principles distilled from the canonical cases and the neglected special 
treatment decisions, a new understanding of sex discrimination emerges—
one that allows for equality-promoting sex classifications such as 
fatherhood bonuses. 
1. Stereotyping, Subordination, and Equal Treatment.—The 
breadwinner–homemaker stereotype stands at the center of many of the 
Supreme Court’s most prominent formal equality rulings. In fact, a close 
examination of these decisions reveals a Court less concerned with 
formalism than with combatting sex-role stereotypes and status-based 
harms. For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court assailed the 
male-as-breadwinner stereotype by striking down an armed services rule 
that granted servicemen benefits to support their wives but denied the same 
automatic allotments to female soldiers.174 According to Justice Brennan’s 
famous observation in Frontiero, “[S]uch discrimination was rationalized 
by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put 
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”175 In many ways, Frontiero 
mirrored the sentiments the Court expressed two years earlier in Reed v. 
Reed, which struck down an Idaho statute that favored men over women as 
estate administrators.176 Whereas the state law in Reed presumed that men 
controlled capital, the armed services rule in Frontiero presumed that 
women controlled the home. Both stereotypes reinforced gender roles that 
limited women’s advancement. In each case, the Court mandated formal 
equality not as a means unto itself but as part of the larger objective of 
dismantling gender hierarchies. 
But even as the Court rooted out invidious governmental stereotypes 
in these equal treatment decisions, it also left open the possibility that other 
special treatment laws might withstand judicial scrutiny. For example, the 
Frontiero Court gave a nod to special treatment when it noted that the 
armed services rule at issue did “not in any sense . . . rectify the effects of 
past discrimination against women.”177 The Court implied, however, that it 
 
173 See Franklin, supra note 76, at 88 (calling for a reexamination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
approach to sex equality). 
174 411 U.S. 677, 679–81 (1973). 
175 Id. at 684. 
176 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
177 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689 n.22. 
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might have ruled differently if the law had rectified those effects.178 
Similarly, in striking down Mississippi’s exclusion of male nursing 
students in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court noted 
that “a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it 
intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is 
disproportionately burdened.”179 
The Supreme Court emphasized the continued relevance of special 
treatment when it struck down the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) 
exclusion of female cadets in United States v. Virginia.180 Justice 
Ginsburg’s majority opinion acknowledged that once women began 
attending VMI, the school would have to perform “alterations necessary to 
afford members of each sex privacy” and to “adjust aspects of the physical 
training programs.”181 Thus, the Court permitted special treatment for a 
physical, sex-based reason (“training programs”) as well as for a socially 
constructed, gender-based rationale (“each sex[’s] privacy”).182 These 
minor changes, the Court presumed, would remove barriers that harmed 
women without altering the school’s fundamental character.183 But Justice 
Ginsburg’s acceptance of special treatment went well beyond tinkering 
with VMI’s specific educational program. In a forceful defense of special 
treatment, she explained how “[s]ex classifications may be used to 
compensate women for particular economic disabilities they have 
suffered, . . . to promote equal employment opportunity, . . . [and] to 
advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s 
people.”184 In other words, even though the Virginia decision itself applied 
equal treatment to advance antisubordination principles, Justice Ginsburg 
simultaneously recognized the power of special treatment to achieve the 
same objective. 
Seven years after Virginia, the Court extended its sex equality analysis 
to the realm of family leave in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs.185 There, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority in holding that 
Congress could expose states to monetary liability for certain FMLA 
 
178 See id.; Colker, supra note 25, at 1025–26 (analyzing the Court’s use of heightened scrutiny in 
Frontiero). 
179 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 
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181 Id. at 550 n.19. 
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183 See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia’s New Gender Equal Protection 
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violations.186 Much like other decisions in the Court’s formal equality 
canon, Hibbs addressed the value of gender neutrality but also emphasized 
broader equal protection principles as well.187 Justice Rehnquist noted that 
many states at the time had granted maternity leave to women for periods 
of time far longer than fathers received.188 By establishing mothers as 
default caregivers, such provisions reaffirmed the notion that “women are 
mothers first, and workers second.”189 Justice Rehnquist presumed that the 
FMLA’s grant of family leave to both sexes on equal terms would advance 
gender equality.190 Although this presumption has not stood the test of 
time,191 Hibbs never considered whether special treatment for fathers might 
produce a better result. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist’s critique of the 
“stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work” remains 
directly relevant to the ongoing problem of maternal profiling.192 
Finally, in its most recent FMLA decision, Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals of Maryland,193 the Court again addressed the connection between 
family leave and sex discrimination. Unlike Hibbs, which involved 
FMLA’s family care provisions, Coleman considered whether allowing 
individual employees to take leave for their own personal medical 
conditions also combatted sex-role stereotypes.194 Declining to find such a 
connection, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion concluded that the 
FMLA’s self-care provision addressed “discrimination on the basis of 
illness, not sex.”195 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg recounted the history of the 
sameness–difference debate and explained why the FMLA’s various 
provisions worked together to “challenge stereotypes of women as lone 
childrearers.”196 But even though both sides disagreed on the empirical 
question of whether employers discriminated against women who took 
leave to care for themselves, both Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg agreed 
that Congress could enact legislation to counteract gender stereotypes that 
hindered women’s workplace advancement. The plurality found “scant 
evidence” that the FMLA provision at issue in Coleman achieved this end, 
 
186 Id. at 724–25. 
187 Id. at 728 n.2 (noting that Congress ensured “that leave is available . . . on a gender-neutral 
basis” (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000))).  
188 Id. at 731. 
189 Id. at 736 (citation omitted). 
190 See Grossman, supra note 15, at 59 (discussing the role that formal equality played in Hibbs).  
191 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736; see also supra Part I.B and accompanying discussion of leave-
taking differentials between men and women. 
192 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731. 
193 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
194 Id. at 1332 (plurality opinion). 
195 Id. at 1335. 
196 Id. at 1339–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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but acknowledged the constitutional power to solve such problems when 
they exist.197 Likewise, Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed the importance of 
“reduc[ing] sex-based inequalities in leave programs” to make it “feasible 
for women to work while sustaining family life.”198 In this way, both 
Justices underscored the constitutional validity of public policies that 
attempt to root out sex-based biases against caregivers. 
As the foregoing account demonstrates, the Court’s celebrated equal 
treatment decisions in fact focus less on line-drawing and more on 
combatting stereotypes that limit women’s full participation in the public 
sphere. According to the Court, the key distinction between permissible 
and impermissible sex classifications is not whether a law constitutes 
“special treatment” or “equal treatment” but whether “official action . . . 
closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men).”199 Although the 
formal equality decisions presumed that equal treatment would open more 
doors, at other times the Court has recognized the potential for special 
treatment to achieve the same end. 
2. Rediscovering Special Treatment.—The Supreme Court’s special 
treatment decisions have become the forgotten stepchildren of equal 
protection. Despite the lack of critical attention paid to this case law, the 
fact remains that at the same time that the Court announced its famous 
equal treatment decisions, it continued to approve of certain sex-based 
classifications as well.200 Thus, despite the prominence of the formal 
equality narrative, this parallel, less-known history reveals how the Court 
has rejected pure formalism in favor of a more malleable notion of equality. 
a. Stereotype-neutral special treatment.—The most recognized 
exception to the Supreme Court’s commitment to treating men and women 
equally occurred in the realm of reproduction.201 The Court’s decision in 
Geduldig v. Aiello represents a memorable example of this type of 
decision.202 In Geduldig, the Court considered whether a state disability 
plan could exclude pregnancy from a list of covered impairments even 
though it covered other physical problems.203 Despite the separation of 
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pregnancy—a condition that obviously affects only women—from other 
disabilities, the Court held that the state was not discriminating based on 
sex because the program distinguished between “pregnant women” and 
“nonpregnant persons.”204 As the Court stated, “While the first group is 
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.”205 More 
than thirty years later, the distinction between “pregnant” and “nonpregnant 
persons” still elicits “pained laughter” from law students.206 
Today, Geduldig stands for the proposition that pregnancy 
discrimination is not sex discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause.207 But this is an oversimplification. Rather than announce a 
wholesale exclusion of pregnancy from equal protection, the Geduldig 
Court simply rejected the broad proposition that “every legislative 
classification concerning pregnancy [was] a sex-based classification.”208 In 
fact, Geduldig suggested that the Court would have struck down a law that 
used pregnancy as a proxy for sex discrimination.209 The decision criticized 
“distinctions involving pregnancy [that] are mere pretexts designed to 
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the 
other.”210 Although the outcome in Geduldig certainly did not benefit 
women, the decision still established the crucial doctrinal point that the 
Court will vet laws affecting pregnant women for any evidence of invidious 
intent. 
The Court applied a similar screen to special treatment in Michael M. 
v. Superior Court, which affirmed a California statutory rape law that 
exposed men, but not women, to criminal liability.211 As in Geduldig, the 
Court found that the law did not perpetuate “invidious” sex discrimination, 
but rather protected young women from the harm of rape-induced 
pregnancies—a risk unique to them.212 Although the decision is laden with 
paternalism, its affirmation of special treatment nevertheless was based on 
the Court’s own empirical assumption (however flawed) that by 
 
204 Id. at 496 n.20. 
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the Geduldig Court’s acknowledgment that pregnancy discrimination can constitute invidious sex 
discrimination at times).  
210 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
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criminalizing male-perpetuated rape only, the state law at issue could 
counteract women’s subordination.213 
Twenty years later, the Court again authorized biologically based 
differential treatment in Nguyen v. INS.214 Affirming a federal immigration 
law that required fathers but not mothers to prove their biological 
connection to nonmarital children, the Nguyen Court stressed that the 
decision had nothing to do with sex-role stereotypes, boldly declaring that 
“[t]his is not a stereotype.”215 Instead, the immigration law at issue simply 
reflected the government’s “recognition that at the moment of birth . . . the 
fact of parenthood [has] been established [for the unwed mother] in a way 
not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.”216 Just as it had done in 
Geduldig and Michael M., the Nguyen Court required the state to satisfy 
certain preconditions before approving of the government’s sex-based 
classification. 
Each of these decisions sanctioned sex discrimination and produced 
outcomes that were not particularly favorable to women: Geduldig 
segregated pregnant women from other disabled workers; Michael M. 
emphasized the fragility of teenage girls; and Nguyen reinforced the old 
notion of mothers as default caregivers.217 But the Court’s rhetorical 
commitment to antistereotyping, antisubordination principles bears noting. 
Geduldig and its progeny made clear that the Court would strike down 
pregnancy laws that reflect gender bias. Likewise, the Justices in Michael 
M. explained how the criminal regulation at issue expanded women’s 
opportunities. And despite a vigorous disagreement between the majority 
and dissent in Nguyen, both sides agreed about the impermissibility of sex 
stereotyping.218 
At the same time, it would be a stretch to categorize these body-based 
special treatment cases as affirmatively advancing an antistereotyping 
agenda. At most, they reflect a “do no harm” approach to sex-based 
classifications. Geduldig and Michael M. emphasized the lack of 
invidiousness in the state laws at issue. Nguyen gave repeated assurances 
that the Court was not reinforcing traditional stereotypes about mothers and 
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fathers. Thus, these decisions embraced what could be called a “stereotype-
neutral” approach to special treatment. When the Court recognizes physical 
differences between the sexes, it will sanction discriminatory policies that 
reflect those differences, but only after verifying that the government has 
not actually advanced invidious sex stereotypes. Yet such a commitment, 
although important to preventing gender-based subordination, fails to 
advance the transformative potential of special treatment. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has not limited its special treatment 
decisions to stereotype-neutral laws that involve the female body. Indeed, 
numerous special treatment decisions have allowed states to enforce sex-
based classifications that affirmatively combat gender stereotypes. Under 
this view, the Court employs equal protection principles not only as a 
shield to protect women from illegitimate laws, but also as a sword to 
affirm those laws that fundamentally disrupt existing systems of gender-
based oppression. Fatherhood bonuses represent this new vision of special 
treatment. 
b. Equality-enhancing special treatment.—The law can do more 
than merely swat away offensive stereotypes. In a series of decisions that 
condoned special treatment for women, the Supreme Court at times has 
embraced governmental attempts to address socialized, gender-based 
differences between the sexes. For example, in Califano v. Webster, the 
Court authorized the Social Security Administration to enforce a rule that 
compensated women for past wage discrimination.219 Backing this form of 
special treatment, the Court explained why the law was not an “accidental 
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females” but instead 
represented a deliberate legislative attempt to counteract the “economic 
disabilities suffered by women” due to “the socialization process of a male-
dominated culture.”220 According to the Court, because gender norms 
caused women to opt out of the workforce and perform a disproportionate 
share of domestic work, the Social Security Administration could 
compensate women for the depressed earnings that resulted from those 
gender-based strictures. All nine Justices of the Supreme Court embraced 
this broad concept of special treatment—a decision that the Court has never 
repudiated.221 
In the realm of sex-based affirmative action, the Court has repeatedly 
eschewed formalism in favor of equality-enhancing special treatment.222 
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Thus, in Schlesinger v. Ballard the Court allowed the Navy to treat men 
and women differently under its up-or-out policy.223 Pursuant to this rule, 
the Navy forced retirement on male officers who had not received any 
promotions in nine years, whereas women received thirteen years to prove 
their worth.224 Mirroring the screen for invidious intent in Geduldig and 
Michael M., the Schlesinger Court found no evidence of “archaic and 
overbroad generalizations” in the law.225 Instead, the Court allowed the 
government to recognize “the demonstrable fact that male and female line 
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities 
for professional service.”226 
The Court again authorized the state to promote women over men in 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency.227 There, a public employer hired the 
first woman ever to work as a road dispatcher over a man who had earned a 
higher interview score.228 Deciding the matter under federal 
antidiscrimination law, Justice Brennan noted that the “limited 
opportunities that have existed in the past” for women could justify special 
treatment.229 According to the Court, if a stereotype about women’s place at 
work (such as a belief that women should not manage road crews) caused 
differential workplace outcomes (such as the entire omission of women 
from a particular field) then the government could utilize sex-based 
classifications. Describing special treatment in terms that extended beyond 
pure remediation, however, Justice Brennan predicted that the affirmative 
action plan at issue would “effect[] a gradual improvement” in women’s 
workforce representation.230 Under this view, a state can employ special 
treatment not only as a means of filling current sex-based gaps but also to 
expand workplace opportunities for women in the future. 
Perhaps more than any other case, the Court’s decision in California 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra reflects the transformative 
potential of special treatment.231 In Guerra, the Court held that federal law 
did not prevent states from requiring pregnant women to receive disability 
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benefits beyond what other workers received. Approving of this form of 
special treatment, Justice Marshall’s majority opinion emphasized that the 
California law at issue applied “only [to a woman’s] period of actual 
physical disability on account of pregnancy.”232 Consistent with this 
language, commentators and courts have described Guerra as a body-based 
example of special treatment.233 But beyond physical differences, Guerra 
also referenced the gender-based demands that caregiving placed on 
mothers. Lillian Garland was the woman at the center of the debate. 
Working as a bank receptionist in Los Angeles, Garland took disability 
leave due to complications from a cesarean-section delivery.234 After her 
employer fired her following her return from leave, Garland could not 
afford housing and eventually lost custody of her daughter.235 As Garland’s 
brief to the Supreme Court noted, “[T]he plight of Ms. Garland is not 
unique; she is one of the several thousand working mothers in the United 
States’ labor force who faces the risk of losing her job after 
childbirth . . . .”236 
The Guerra decision alluded to these broader gender-based burdens 
when Justice Marshall observed that pregnancy discrimination “is a social 
phenomenon encased in a social context.”237 Lillian Garland suffered not 
only from her physical limitations but also from a confluence of forces 
related to caregiving and economic hardships. As a single parent, Garland 
was primarily responsible for caring for her daughter until she lost 
custody.238 Thus, in the weeks while Garland took “physical” disability 
leave, she took “caregiver” leave as well. According to Guerra, if 
employers allowed men to have children and keep their jobs, then the law 
could ensure the same right to women through mother-specific rights.239 As 
Justice Marshall noted, “The entire thrust . . . behind this legislation is to 
guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the 
workforce . . . .”240 As such, although Guerra technically involved a 
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physical disability law, its reference to the “social phenomenon” of 
pregnancy discrimination also pointed to the broader, gender-based barriers 
that limited women’s advancement. These concerns remain relevant today, 
even though the Court decided Guerra and many other special treatment 
decisions years ago. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the legislative importance 
of combatting sex-role stereotypes this decade,241 and no case has reversed 
the earlier decisions discussed here that authorized the use of equality-
promoting special treatment. 
Laws can enhance stereotypes, counteract them, or at least avoid 
promoting them. Most of the Court’s equal treatment decisions involved 
stereotype-enhancing laws that the Court struck down for relying upon 
stereotypical assumptions about women’s domestic roles. In other 
decisions, the Court left intact laws that treated women differently than 
men based not on stereotypes, but rather on the biological or physical 
differences between the sexes. But the Court’s sex equality jurisprudence 
extended beyond stereotype-enhancing laws and stereotype-neutral laws to 
laws that counteracted the historically harmful effects of sex-role 
stereotypes. Permitting laws that favored women in certain instances, this 
approach to sex-based classifications created the legal space for more 
ambitious forms of special treatment for men as well. 
III. BUILDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE BY DECONSTRUCTING 
MASCULINE STEREOTYPES 
Because the Supreme Court sanctions certain discriminatory policies 
that challenge gender stereotypes, the constitutional argument for 
fatherhood bonuses begins with understanding the gender stereotypes that 
shape male behavior and cause women harm. The Supreme Court has 
occasionally alluded to these gendered forms. For example, it has 
castigated “traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles 
of men and women”242 and challenged governmental actions that “den[y] 
opportunity to women (or to men).”243 Building on these concerns, an 
effective analysis of masculine gender norms would seek to understand 
how the rules of manhood limit women’s workplace opportunities. 
Unfortunately, legal feminism cannot fully meet this need. This is not to 
say that feminist scholarship has ignored men altogether; indeed, a large 
body of empirical and theoretical feminism has scrutinized the masculine 
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bias of legal rules and institutions.244 Yet despite the value in exposing the 
oppressive force of male power, legal feminism has rarely presented men 
as gendered beings themselves.245 Instead, the dominant feminist critique of 
patriarchal privilege tends to depict men in an undifferentiated light: 
privileged, unified, and singular.246 This essentialized presentation leaves 
little room for understanding how gender norms affect men’s behaviors or 
how power disparities among men can harm certain men as well as 
women.247 
Fortunately, a different model of gender analysis stands ready to 
explain how cultural norms shape men’s gendered identities. The study of 
masculinities attempts to understand the social construction of manhood.248 
Whereas feminism explains what men do, masculinities theory explains 
how and why they do it. Originating primarily from psychology, feminist 
theory, queer theory, and sociology, masculinities theory presents men as 
gendered beings who attempt to prove their gender to other men.249 
Although masculinities theory rose to prominence in the humanities 
and social sciences during the 1980s, it did not attract a great deal of 
critical attention from the legal academy until the 1990s—well past the 
time when the Supreme Court had articulated its antistereotyping approach 
to equal protection.250 Despite this gap in time, however, the study of 
masculinities represents a crucial tool for advancing the Court’s sex 
equality jurisprudence and understanding the role fatherhood bonuses can 
play in expanding opportunities for both sexes. The three concepts of 
status, stereotyping, and subordination that derive from masculinities 
theory help explain why fatherhood bonuses would satisfy the Court’s test 
for permissible instances of special treatment. 
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First, masculinities theory teaches that men constantly seek to 
establish their status as men, engaging in never-ending competitions to out-
man each other.251 Given the importance of status to men, governmental 
policies can send a signal to men (who can then send a signal to one 
another) that a decision to take parental leave actually conforms to behavior 
that society has identified as culturally and morally beneficial.252 Applying 
this knowledge to the Supreme Court’s special treatment test, the 
significance of status to men means that a policy targeting men specifically 
has a more substantial relationship to the “important governmental 
objective” of combatting women’s subordination than a gender-neutral 
approach.253 
Second, masculinities theory provides a method for highlighting the 
stereotypes that compel men to avoid domestic work. By focusing on these 
rules of manhood, the study of masculinities can, as the Supreme Court has 
suggested, scrutinize “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of 
males and females.”254 
Third, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, masculinities theory 
explains how gender norms subordinate men as well as women. Although 
men enjoy a great deal of social power and privilege, the “straightjacket of 
conventional masculinity” also causes them to engage in behaviors that 
harm their health and emotional well-being.255 These behaviors injure 
women who must fill in the gaps created by the masculine norm of 
detached parenting.256 In this way, an examination of masculine gender 
norms helps explain how fatherhood bonuses would expand women’s 
opportunities by incentivizing male caregiving. 
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A. Status: The Need for Governmental Signaling Through  
Male-Specific Targets 
At its core, masculinity is fundamentally an anxious endeavor.257 This 
anxiety derives largely from the fact that most men try and fail to attain 
“dominant” or “hegemonic” masculinity.258 Establishing an unattainable 
standard for men, hegemonic masculinity ranks men according to how well 
they conform to its definition of “perfected” manhood.259 Although the 
precise attributes of hegemonic masculinity differ among groups, its 
common features include strength, aggression, competition, lack of 
emotion, and heterosexuality.260 Beyond these qualities, though, hegemonic 
masculinity’s central organizing principle requires the rejection of any 
conduct associated with femininity.261 Enforcing these requirements, 
hegemonic masculinity calls on men to repudiate contrasting figures such 
as women and gay men.262 
Men draw from masculinity’s list of idealized qualities to prove their 
manhood to other men.263 According to Michael Kimmel, a leading 
masculinities theorist, these gender-based performances attest to 
masculinity’s “homosocial” nature.264 That is, men engage in masculine 
performances to demonstrate their manhood to other men. As Kimmel 
states, “We test ourselves, perform heroic feats, take enormous risks all 
because we want other men to grant us our manhood.”265 
Given the current associations between parental leave and feminine 
behavior, masculinities theory suggests that men’s fear of losing traction in 
their intragroup competitions will continue to prevent them from taking 
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leave as long as such behavior remains coded feminine.266 But in addition to 
explaining why men fail to utilize parental leave, the study of masculinities 
also provides a roadmap for designing a policy that can loosen the 
association between parental leave and femininity. This begins by 
understanding the variable nature of masculinity itself. 
Gender theorists prefer the term “masculinities” over “masculinity” to 
emphasize men’s multiple, competing gender performances.267 Indeed, 
many men perform subordinated masculinities to counterbalance the more 
idealized form of manhood that hegemonic masculinity exemplifies.268 For 
example, whereas some men may act “hypermasculine” through 
exaggerated acts of sexual activity or exhibitions of physical strength, other 
men may subvert the dominant norm by emphasizing their grace, style, or 
artistry.269 As such, those exhibiting subordinated masculinities attempt to 
reclaim power by redefining their behavior as normatively superior. 
At-home fathers exemplify this process of redefining the 
characteristics of acceptable manhood. Although still small in absolute 
terms, the number of men in the United States who stay home and serve as 
their children’s primary caregiver has doubled in the past decade.270 
Numerous studies have shown how idealized masculinity forces these men 
to recast their behavior in nonfeminine terms.271 For example, many at-
home fathers tend to emphasize activities such as playing sports with their 
children over more sedentary endeavors.272 Others may stress the 
importance of outdoor pursuits, risk-taking, and independence, thereby 
giving their work a masculine hue.273 In the process, these men demonstrate 
the contingent nature of masculinity; that is, by disassociating their work 
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from traditionally feminine behavior, at-home fathers present a new vision 
of fatherhood that allows them to assume a primary caregiving role.274 
Other countries have shown how properly designed work–family laws 
can expand the bounds of acceptable masculine behavior. Consider again 
the case of Sweden, which in 1974 became the first country in the world to 
pass legislation offering men paid parental leave.275 Even with generous 
financial incentives, few men actually took leave because Sweden allowed 
men to transfer all of their leave to women.276 Consistent with the penalties 
men experience for violating dominant masculinity, society reserved the 
label “velvet dads” for the few men who dared to take leave.277 Not until the 
advent of father-targeted leave—along with an aggressive publicity 
campaign that depicted a macho weightlifter holding a newborn—did the 
rate of Swedish men using parental leave jump from six percent to eighty-
five percent.278 Similarly, the government in Finland recently acted upon 
the need to publicly promote men’s care work by offering a “father’s 
month” of leave and posting billboards that asked, “How many men, upon 
dying, wish they had spent more time with their bosses?”279 Recognizing 
the insecure nature of masculinity, these countries have attempted to put a 
masculine spin on care work, thereby encouraging men to engage in that 
work. 
Social norms reinforce patterns of behavior. As such, the more that 
men engage in public acts of care like pushing strollers, changing diapers, 
and supervising children at playgrounds, the more that society begins to 
view their behavior as “normal” and, eventually, “normative.”280 In fact, the 
tipping point at which masculine norms begin to change may occur long 
before the majority of men actually display alternative behaviors.281 For 
example, one optimistic estimate predicts that most of the population will 
view men’s public acts of care as normatively appropriate when at least 
twenty percent of men become actively engaged in this work.282 Although 
the precise percentages may differ depending on the cultural and social 
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circumstances, the theoretical connection between normative change and 
public perception is entirely consistent with the study of masculinities. 
Given that masculine ideals vary in different contexts based on social 
contingencies, it is quite feasible for men to redefine parental leave in 
masculine terms once it becomes clear that such behavior will not 
automatically cause them identity-based losses.283 
Because cultural change depends on structural support, parental leave 
policies must involve both male targeting and strong governmental 
signaling.284 Although a gender-neutral approach might avoid certain 
constitutional challenges,285 it would lack the father-specific governmental 
imprimatur that could prompt more men to act. There is a reason why 
Finland promoted fatherhood bonuses with a publicity campaign that 
challenged men to confront their bosses on work–family matters. After all, 
who engages in the more “manly” performance: the father who publicly 
embraces his responsibilities at home or the man who ignores his children 
while working late into the night?286 A government-backed system 
recognizing the unique nature of men’s gender performances can radically 
reorient the cultural understanding of domestic work. 
By explaining why gender-specific incentives represent the most 
effective method for encouraging men to engage in care work (thereby 
supporting women’s public participation), masculinities theory helps 
provide the “substantial justification” the government would need to enact 
fatherhood bonuses.287 As long as parental leave remains de facto 
“maternity leave,” men will refuse to take leave to avoid receiving the 
“velvet dad” label from other men. But masculinities theory does more than 
demonstrate the connection between fatherhood bonuses and existing 
masculine norms. By explaining how men’s current refusal to take leave 
reinforces negative, gender-based stereotypes, the study of masculinities 
shows how father-targeted leave can advance the “important governmental 
objectives” of combatting those stereotypes and promoting greater gender 
equality.288 
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B. Stereotypes: Why Men Do Not Care 
The study of masculinities teaches that men define themselves less by 
what they are and more by what they are not.289 Through a lifetime of 
repetition, the rules of manhood tell men to avoid engaging in feminine 
behavior at all costs.290 Given the long-held associations between women 
and domestic work, men follow the call of antifemininity by disengaging 
from that work.291 
The connection between women and caring for children remains 
entrenched in our culture. Since the rise of the “separate spheres” ideology 
during the nineteenth century, American society has largely presumed that 
women are predisposed to care for children, while men are not.292 Despite 
women’s success in the marketplace in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, the presumption of female domesticity remains a lasting 
cultural fixture. It is unsurprising, then, that today both employed and 
jobless women perform a far greater share of childcare than men.293 
Women’s adherence to this norm deemphasizes male-based caregiving 
in a number of ways. Take, for example, the practice of “intensive 
mothering,” which obligates mothers to ensure their children’s constant 
stimulation.294 From scheduling playdates, to coordinating lessons, to 
designing enrichment activities, mothers remain primarily responsible for 
guaranteeing the social and emotional well-being of their children. In 
contrast, men experience no similar cultural imperative.295 In fact, the call 
to nurture even causes some women to obstruct men’s efforts to participate 
in caregiving.296 Psychologists describe the phenomenon of “gatekeeping” 
among mothers who restrict the amount of childcare that men can 
perform.297 Whether they do this to preserve domestic power or to defend 
against male incompetence, gatekeepers control access to children by 
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holding fathers to unrealistic expectations, monitoring fathers in their 
interactions with their children, redoing fathers’ childcare work, or 
ridiculing fathers for their caregiving “errors.”298 
But gatekeeping alone is certainly not the central reason why men fail 
to engage in greater levels of caregiving. Instead, masculinities theory 
teaches that a constellation of masculine norms encourages men to distance 
themselves from anything deemed “womanly.”299 This is reflected in the 
markedly different language employed when describing male caregiving 
and female caregiving. For example, fathers who watch their children are 
described as “babysitters,” whereas mothers who stay at home are doing 
the “most important job in the world.”300 Similarly, popular rhetoric 
categorizes men who “show their feminine side” as honorary women, 
thereby undermining their efforts to subvert masculine norms.301 
Reinforcing the primacy of motherly care, many men espouse the ideal 
of coequal parenting but rarely take the steps needed to ease their partners’ 
domestic burdens.302 Consider a recent study of fathers in Fortune 500 
companies.303 In it, sixty-five percent of men said they believed in the 
concept of shared parenting, but only thirty percent actually performed the 
same amount of care as their partners.304 In addition, these fathers ranked 
“[doing] your part in the day-to-day childcare tasks” last among six 
qualities associated with being a “good father.”305 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
then, over seventy-five percent of these fathers took one week or less of 
parental leave, whereas women in the study took six to twelve weeks of 
leave when they became mothers.306 As these experiences show, masculine 
norms may permit men to speak generally about the value of shared 
parenting, but the rules of manhood keep them from translating such 
aspirations into practice. 
Of course, the male reluctance to perform care work extends well 
beyond Fortune 500 men. Indeed, numerous studies demonstrate that 
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American fathers spend far fewer hours performing childcare than mothers 
and take much less parental leave than women.307 Drawing from this data, 
masculinities theory offers a useful method for linking men’s gendered acts 
to the Supreme Court’s test for authorizing certain sex-based 
classifications. The Supreme Court has noted the importance of challenging 
“traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men 
and women.”308 Just as the Supreme Court has identified the ways in which 
domesticity stifles women, the study of masculinities demonstrates the 
powerful influence that gender norms have on men’s behavior as well. 
Feeling that their masculinity is constantly on the line, men fear the 
humiliation that comes from associating their acts with those traditionally 
performed by women.309 Given the feminized nature of caregiving, the rules 
of manhood require men to resist any effort to engage in more coequal 
forms of parenting. 
But the government cannot act upon sex classifications merely by 
highlighting the gender stereotypes at issue. Rather, in order to affirm a law 
that combats deeply rooted gender norms, the Supreme Court looks for 
evidence that the stereotypes at issue limit men’s or women’s 
advancement.310 The study of masculinities builds this case by highlighting 
the real-world consequences of men’s complicity with hegemonic 
masculinity. 
C. Subordination: How Masculine Norms Constrain Both Sexes 
When men play by the rules of manhood, both sexes lose. On this 
point, masculinities theory makes the seemingly paradoxical assertion that 
masculine norms both subordinate and privilege men.311 Given that gender 
rules tend to buttress male power, it might seem counterintuitive that men 
would have any interest in dismantling a gender system that produces so 
many tangible benefits for them.312 Yet masculinities theory suggests that 
men pay a price for their privilege.313 For example, the masculine norms of 
strength and aggression cause men to suffer from violent crimes at far 
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higher rates than women.314 Masculinity takes an emotional toll on men as 
well. Taught from an early age to hide their emotions, boys who express 
grief are told to “take it like a man” and that “boys don’t cry.”315 These 
modes of suppression lead to deeper anxieties and stunted interpersonal 
development as boys and men repeatedly adhere to unrelenting masculine 
expectations.316 
The same strictures affect men’s parental roles. For instance, the status 
of mothers as default parents means that many fathers share a secondary, 
less-meaningful relationship with their children.317 Thus, the masculine 
requirement to disengage from care has profound consequences for fathers 
who are twice as likely as mothers to believe that they do not spend enough 
time with their children.318 In fact, today, for the first time ever, working 
fathers report experiencing more work–family conflict than mothers.319 Yet 
despite the fact that nearly all fathers say they would like to see their 
children more often, the masculine call to avoid domestic work hinders 
them from doing so.320 
As a hegemonic form that seeks to quietly define cultural norms for 
both sexes, masculinity inflicts tangible economic hardships on women as 
well. Gender theorists talk about a “patriarchal dividend” that men earn 
from masculinity’s invisibility.321 Men’s disengagement from domestic 
work frees them to pursue market work without drawing much attention to 
their domestic absence. The dividend yielded from men’s seemingly 
“normal” or “natural” detachment from childcare allows them to work 
longer hours and maintain a continuous presence in the labor market.322 All 
men—even those who attempt to resist hegemonic masculinity—benefit 
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economically from the marketplace gains that the dominant masculine form 
yields.323 
In contrast, women’s diminished attachment to paid labor (as 
compared to men) causes a substantial loss of career opportunities. Half of 
American women do not return to work within six months of their child’s 
birth,324 and over one-third of mothers with children under the age of six do 
not participate in the labor force at all.325 These departures from paid labor 
cause women to lose job-specific capital such as skills training and career 
development.326 As women remain away from work for extended periods of 
time, their ability to earn higher wages and receive promotions becomes 
increasingly diminished.327 Even when women reenter the workforce, most 
can never fully recover the losses that their marketplace exits created.328 
Thus, the taken-for-granted acceptance of men’s reduced caregiving roles 
results in a loss of social power and workplace privileges for women.329 
The Supreme Court has criticized governmental classifications that 
limit women’s economic and public activities.330 As the Court has 
observed, when the state utilizes age-old stereotypes about women’s 
“proper place,” it “perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority 
of women.”331 Consistent with the Court’s antistereotyping, 
antisubordination principles, masculinities theory explains how certain 
gender norms indiscernibly limit the boundaries of appropriate male 
behavior, thereby hampering women’s career progress. 
But as explained above, in addition to striking down classifications 
that impede women’s advancement, the Court has approved of sex-specific 
laws that enhance gender equality.332 Indeed, a decision that sanctioned 
fatherhood bonuses would follow a long line of Court decisions that have 
approved of special treatment for women in response to job segregation,333 
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economic inequality,334 and discrimination.335 Advancing the principles 
expressed in these cases, masculinities theory explains how fatherhood 
bonuses also expand women’s workplace opportunities by easing their 
domestic burdens while broadening the universe of acceptable behaviors 
for men. In so doing, father-targeted leave represents another instance of 
constitutionally appropriate special treatment that has the potential to 
loosen gender-based strictures while encouraging women’s public 
participation. 
IV. A MODEL FOR FATHER-TARGETED LEAVE IN THE UNITED STATES 
To critics of paid parental leave and fatherhood bonuses, the 
government has no business funding individual choices related to the 
family. After all, why should parents expect society to bear the costs of 
their personal procreative decisions?336 If, for example, American mothers 
decide to leave their jobs to spend more time with their children, it hardly 
seems fair for others to subsidize their actions. Likewise, childless 
coworkers may understandably become resentful of the enhanced 
workloads heaped upon them by parents who demand entitlements such as 
parental leave and bonuses but are unwilling to suffer career losses as a 
result.337 The key to building popular support for fatherhood bonuses 
depends on addressing these concerns. 
To this point, the Article has asked the constitutional question of 
whether fatherhood bonuses could withstand judicial scrutiny and has 
shown that they would. It is now time to ask how the government might 
structure such a policy in a way that accommodates a diverse set of 
interests and constituencies. Celebrating the values of autonomy and 
personal freedom, Americans have long distrusted governmental attempts 
to intervene in private matters such as family caregiving.338 Reflecting this 
distrust, neoclassical economic theory posits that freely made private 
decisions do not deserve special protection under the law.339 This is 
especially true in the area of parental leave where reproductive decisions 
generate real costs for employers in the form of workplace departures and 
replacement training costs. A law that places these costs on employers—as 
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opposed to the workers who generate them—has the potential to cause 
workplace inefficiencies.340 
But such economic critiques carry little practical value when 
conducted in a vacuum. Instead, a genuine cost-benefit analysis of any 
parental leave proposal ought to compare the costs of reform to the costs 
generated by the status quo. Under our nation’s existing family leave 
system, the true cost-bearers of reproduction are not solely pregnant 
women or even caregiving mothers, but rather all female workers.341 
Because employers view all women (childless or not) as potential domestic 
caregivers—regardless of whether any individual woman actually intends 
to depart the labor force or not—all working women pay the price for 
maternal profiling.342 In contrast to the existing dynamic, a properly 
designed parental leave system would not externalize the costs of 
procreation exclusively to one sex. If mothers and fathers posed the same 
risk of taking parental leave, for example, employers could no longer 
rationally assume that only women would depart the workplace, thereby 
undermining employers’ basis for engaging in sex-specific statistical 
discrimination in hiring practices.343 Certainly, employers could still 
statistically discriminate against parents, but that would involve a much 
weaker basis for differentiation than the current sex-based proxy.344 
Because roughly eighty-five percent of men and women have children at 
some point in their lives,345 the victims of parental-based discrimination 
could spread the risks of such differentiation across a much larger 
population. In fact, given the difficulty that workers have in signaling their 
intention to have children or not, nearly every employee of childbearing 
age would represent a risk of early career interruptions to employers, 
thereby significantly weakening the ability to discriminate against any 
individual.346 
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But a policy that shifts costs completely to parents is not normatively 
desirable either. Parents should not be the sole cost-bearers of paid parental 
leave because they are not the sole beneficiaries of such policies either. 
Raising society’s dependents is a public good that benefits all Americans.347 
Although parents pay the private costs of childrearing, all of society gains 
when parents raise children to become productive, responsible adults.348 As 
a means of supporting men and women in their parental roles, paid leave 
and fatherhood bonuses represent tangible investments in this public good. 
Legislatures that recognize the value of this investment must also 
acknowledge its limitations. In fact, no one policy can completely shift the 
costs of statistical discrimination away from women. Even in the idealized 
world of Scandinavia, for example, fatherhood bonuses have not ended 
wage disparities between men and women or cured sex discrimination.349 
Male targeting merely reduces, rather than eliminates, caregiving 
asymmetries. Indeed, the ultimate goal of these policies is not necessarily 
to achieve coequal parenting among all couples, but rather to “de-gender” 
specific activities in a way that weakens the association between caregiving 
and femininity.350 
Given these realities, parental leave reform must represent a low-cost 
proposition to employers in order to diminish any remaining impulses to 
engage in maternal profiling.351 Recognizing that reform will not 
completely close sex-based gaps among employees who take leave, the 
government should structure paid leave and fatherhood bonuses around an 
insurance-based, risk-pooling model that lowers employers’ incentives to 
distinguish between leave-takers and other workers.352 The lower a firm’s 
costs associated with leave-taking, the more likely an employer will 
approach hiring decisions in a gender-neutral manner.353 The law can 
encourage this shift by: (1) minimizing employers’ direct contributions to 
the system; (2) pooling risk among the greatest number of firms; and (3) 
maximizing usage among eligible employees.354 
 
347 See Bartlett, supra note 5, at 400–01 (summarizing feminist debates over the concept of 
childrearing as a public good). 
348 See Gornick & Meyers, supra note 22, at 323; Kaminer, supra note 8, at 319 (explaining how 
the work of parents benefits society). 
349 See Haas & Hwang, supra note 76, at 90 (analyzing Sweden’s pay gap); see also Doucet, supra 
note 21 (discussing the symbolic and practical importance of including fathers in parental leave 
policies). 
350 See Brighouse & Wright, supra note 14, at 363 (advocating for social relations “unaffected by 
gender”).  
351 See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 18, at 2216 (proposing methods for diminishing the 
risks of maternal profiling).  
352 Id. at 2216–17 (outlining an insurance approach to maternity leave). 
353 Id. at 2217 (arguing in favor of an employer-funded system based on payroll taxes). 
354 See id. at 2221; Fondas, supra note 112 (describing an insurance model for family leave). 
109:1 (2015) (Un)Equal Protection 
51 
A few paid leave systems emerging in the United States have begun to 
embrace these concepts.355 For example, both California and New Jersey 
offer men and women partially paid parental leave for newborn care.356 
Modeled after each state’s disability laws, neither system imparts any direct 
costs on employers. Rather, employees fund these insurance schemes 
through modest payroll taxes.357 Although companies still bear certain 
indirect costs that result from temporary employee losses, evidence 
suggests that paid leave has had either no effect or a positive effect on 
productivity, profitability, and employee morale in these firms.358 
Recognizing the need to pool risk among many businesses to reduce the 
harm experienced by any one firm when an employee takes leave, these 
states require nearly all companies to participate in the system.359 In theory, 
this system might expose small businesses to greater risk given that firms 
with larger workforces can better absorb workload shifts that result from an 
individual employee’s departure. But given the short-term nature of the 
leave involved and the fact that businesses can fund gap-filling measures 
with wages that would have gone to leave-takers, these disruptions should 
be minimal in most cases. In fact, a comprehensive study of California’s 
family leave policy found that small employers actually experienced fewer 
negative effects from the law.360 
Although the foregoing factors all help weaken the power of maternal 
profiling by making leave-taking a low-cost proposition for businesses, the 
most crucial variable for success depends on getting men more involved. 
The government could do this in a number of ways. A quota system might 
give families additional weeks of leave if men took off a designated 
amount of time from work following a child’s birth or adoption.361 Under 
this scheme, the father’s leave would be structured on a “use-it-or-lose-it” 
basis, meaning that the government would not require men to take leave, 
but if they failed to take it, their families would earn less than the full 
insurance benefit.362 Similarly, the state could offer a bonus system in 
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which men could earn additional days of leave for themselves if they took a 
certain threshold amount.363 For example, if a father took two weeks of 
leave, the insurance system might pay for two additional weeks of leave as 
a reward. 
In theory, of course, a parental leave law could offer these incentives 
in gender-neutral terms. A policy might grant three months of leave to a 
“first caregiver” and offer a bonus month if a “second caregiver” took some 
designated amount of time as well. Indeed, some countries have taken this 
gender-neutral approach to incentives,364 while others have directly called 
out men.365 However, a gender-neutral system would probably yield less 
gender equity than a father-specific policy, and would raise legal questions 
of its own.366 Certainly a gender-neutral policy might change some parents’ 
behaviors. But, as explained below, father-specific incentives hold much 
more practical and theoretical potential to disrupt gender norms and alter 
caregiving patterns. 
The nation’s history with family leave policies points to the 
inadequacies of gender neutrality in the work–family arena. For example, 
more than twenty years since its implementation, the FMLA’s gender-
neutral approach to leave has not significantly altered leave-taking 
differences between men and women.367 Although the common excuse for 
male inaction focuses on the unpaid nature of the FMLA, even paid leave 
might not significantly affect existing trends.368 In California, for example, 
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both mothers and fathers have had the opportunity to take paid family leave 
for a decade.369 Yet despite the fact that the state has always offered this 
benefit in gender-neutral terms, women still constitute nearly three-quarters 
of workers who take so-called “bonding leave” to care for newborns, and 
the average mother’s leave is four times longer than the average father’s.370 
In short, gender neutrality has failed to close large, sex-based gaps in 
California even though men have had paid leave available to them. 
The study of masculinities explains why incentives that specifically 
call out “fathers” represent the most effective method for encouraging men 
to take leave. Patterns of behavior, social norms, and public policy 
mutually reinforce one another.371 If a father quickly returns to work after a 
child’s birth, his behavior serves as a sign to other men that taking leave 
constitutes an inherently feminine act. Rooted in deeply held gendered 
identities, these actions and norms will continue to reinforce each other 
until public policies or social pressures radically disrupt them.372 
Unfortunately, a gender-neutral policy would send only a weak signal to 
men—a law that offered bonuses to “second caregivers” rather than to 
“fathers” would encourage only those men with enough savvy and 
confidence to claim the new entitlement. In contrast, reframing the bonus 
as one reserved for “fathers” sends a clear governmental message to men 
that society deems their involvement in childcare to be morally desirable 
and socially beneficial.373 Governmental rules help publicize the 
community’s approval of certain behavior, thereby creating a normative 
expectation for men to engage in that behavior.374 Responding to legislation 
designed specifically for them, men who claim bonuses for “fathers” do so 
with the backing of their family, community, and peer groups. Given the 
influence that social pressure and intragroup competitions have on men, a 
law unambiguously directed at them carries the greatest potential to change 
their behavior.375 
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A bonus offered to “second caregivers” contains rhetorical 
shortcomings as well. By extending bonuses to male “second caregivers”—
as opposed to “fathers”—a gender-neutral approach reinforces the existing 
presumption that men play only a secondary role in their children’s lives. 
The “second” caregiver may perform some childcare while he earns his 
bonus, but “primary” responsibility for running the household remains with 
his partner. Buttressing the concept of maternal primacy, the gender-neutral 
system reinforces age-old frames about each parent’s proper role. 
Designing a law that maximizes men’s use of parental leave has 
tremendous implications for women. Indeed, if gender-neutral targets failed 
to significantly increase the rate at which men utilized a new program, 
maternal profiling might become more problematic. Assuming that the 
government initiated an insurance-based leave system that offered some 
level of income replacement, women might appear even more expensive 
relative to men if existing differentials in usage remained constant.376 In 
fact, the larger the gap in leave-taking, the more expensive female 
employees would become under a paid scheme, thereby creating greater 
incentives for employers to engage in maternal profiling.377 Therefore, even 
if the use of father-specific incentives (as opposed to a sex-neutral 
approach) increased men’s marginal use by only a few percentage points, 
such a difference could dramatically reduce the overall risk of maternal 
profiling that women currently face in the labor market.378 
Fatherhood bonuses must also account for same-sex and single 
parents. In fact, any policy development on this front should broaden the 
base of potential beneficiaries beyond two-parent, opposite-sex households 
to reduce the risk of discrimination faced by all leave-takers. The number 
of households led by single parents and same-sex couples has increased 
markedly over the last generation.379 Reflecting the importance of this 
issue, European countries with fatherhood bonuses have also extended 
family leave benefits to a wide variety of family arrangements.380 For 
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example, Germany offers fourteen months of family leave to two-parent 
households, and allows single parents to claim the same amount of leave as 
well.381 Likewise, in Québec, lesbian co-mothers can receive five bonus 
weeks of leave in the same manner as fathers in opposite-sex 
relationships.382 These inclusive models work in tandem with fatherhood 
bonuses. By recognizing the diverse landscape of child-rearing 
environments, such policies maximize the number of sexes and sexual 
orientations associated with family leave, thereby diluting the gendered 
nature of leave itself—a central goal of fatherhood bonuses.383 
In sum, a properly designed fatherhood bonus would extend leave 
benefits to all forms of parental arrangements, pool risks among employers, 
minimize women’s exposure to discrimination, and, most critically, target 
men specifically. By focusing on men, fatherhood bonuses would provide 
cover to leave-taking fathers who could point to the governmental policy as 
the explicit justification for their decision to take leave. This outcome 
would differ significantly from our nation’s current approach to paternal 
leave, which tends to categorize such employees as less-committed 
workers.384 A fatherhood bonus would help reverse this presumption, while 
simultaneously forcing “traditional” fathers to confront the opportunity 
losses that they would experience—both financially and interpersonally—if 
they were to reject the new benefits available to them.385 By placing these 
choices directly in front of men, fatherhood bonuses represent the most 
effective method for incentivizing paternal caregiving and minimizing the 
harm of maternal profiling. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite their disagreements, sameness feminists and differences 
feminists have always shared the same goal of ending sexual oppression.386 
United in purpose, they have differed in tactics. In the course of these 
discussions, however, both sides have focused on the narrow question of 
whether female-specific protections help or hurt women. Building on these 
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debates, a new understanding of gender equality must look beyond female-
centered measures and create room for men as well. 
The masculine norm that directs men to avoid domestic work causes a 
large number of women to assume a disproportionate share of that work. 
This disparity, in turn, reinforces age-old stereotypes holding that women 
enjoy a natural predisposition to care for children, while men lack any 
corresponding biological code. Women’s subordination flows directly from 
these gendered presumptions. The perception of mothers as “expert” 
caregivers exposes them to social pressures to sacrifice their careers, while 
men, as seemingly less-talented parents, continue to compete in the 
marketplace unimpeded. As the Supreme Court has observed, laws ought 
not “perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”387 
Fatherhood bonuses would not only combat gender norms that limit 
women’s opportunities, they would expand the realm of “acceptable” 
behavior for men as well. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition to the contrary, employers 
will continue to profile women as “mothers-to-be” as long as men remain 
comfortably detached from the day-to-day responsibilities of care work.388 
By inducing men to step out of their entrenched parental roles, fatherhood 
bonuses can send a strong, state-sponsored message that the decision to 
take parental leave represents a safe way to be a man. Released from the 
masculine expectation of detached parenting, men can enter the domestic 
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